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"The court finds [that Nebraska's] Section 29 is a denial of access to one of
our most fundamental sources of protection, the government. Such a broad
exclusion ... is 'itself a denial of equal protection in the most literal
sense. "* So said Judge Joseph Bataillon of the District of Nebraska in
striking down Nebraska's "defense of marriage" amendment on equal
protection grounds. His disposition was short-lived, however-the Eighth
Circuit reversed him on July 14, 2006. The Eighth Circuit's decision, while
generally correct as a judgment, nonetheless suffered from the same
conclusory logic plaguing much modern legal analysis of whether "defense
of marriage" amendments comply with the Equal Protection Clause. This
Note seeks to transcend that over-generalized legal debate.
Twenty-seven states have passed "defense of marriage" amendments in the
last decade. While those states have approximately the same goal in mind-
namely, to restrict the possibility of the state legally recognizing certain
same-sex relationships-the breadth of those amendments vary widely.
Hawaii, for example, merely reserves recognition or non-recognition of
same-sex marriage solely to the legislature. Alaska defines marriage as
between a man and a woman but leaves the door open for alternative legal
arrangements such as domestic partnerships. Nebraska prohibits same-sex
marriage, civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other like legal statuses.
Meanwhile, Louisiana and Oklahoma not only ban same-sex marriage, but
forbid "the legal incidents" of marriage-assumedly the benefits and
protections traditionally accompanying marital status-from being
conferred on same-sex couples.
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Such breadth defies any categorical statement of constitutional validity.
However, groups of amendments can be analyzed based on their
restrictiveness, and that is the approach this Note takes. First, it divides
state "defense of marriage" amendments into four distinct categories based
on the extent to which they forbid state and local recognition of same-sex
relationships. Second, it creates an equal protection framework, based on
current Supreme Court jurisprudence, to determine whether a state
amendment violates equal protection. And finally, it opines on the
constitutionality of the various categories of "defense of marriage"
amendments based on this framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dissenting in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the 2003
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision mandating same-sex
marriage, Justice Martha Sosman noted that the debate over same-sex
marriage has become "a 'perfect storm' of a constitutional question."1 But
the same-sex marriage debate-which has seemingly become a launching
pad for pious pronouncements from pulpits and politicians 2-was not always
a white squall. Just as the assassination of a single archduke embroiled the
developed world in a four-year conflict, 3 the first shot in the modem war
1 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 982 (Mass. 2003) (Sosman, J.,
dissenting).
2 See, e.g., Eric Pooley, A Rudy Awakening, TIME, Feb. 19, 2007, at 42, 43
(discussing former New York Mayor and presidential candidate Rudy Giuliani's
statement that "[m]arriage should be between a man and a woman[; that's] exactly the
position I've always had"); Neal Conan, Talk of the Nation: New Mexico Gov.
Richardson Eyes Presidency (National Public Radio broadcast Feb. 13, 2007), available
at http://www.npr.org/transcripts/ (search for "New Mexico Gov. Richardson Eyes
Presidency") (Governor and Presidential candidate Bill Richardson stating that gay
marriage "has to wait. I think let's find ways to make sure that we have enough civil
union protections, non-discriminatory protections. That's what I would advocate.");
President George W. Bush, Remarks on a Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect
Marriage (June 5, 2006), in 42 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1076,
1076, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/nara003.html (select "2006
Presidential Documents" and submit search term "marriage;" then select first result)
("[There is] a broad consensus in our country for protecting the institution of marriage.
The people have spoken. Unfortunately, this consensus is being undermined by activist
judges and local officials who have struck down State laws protecting marriage and made
an aggressive attempt to redefine marriage."); Carla Marinucci, Kucinich Gives Spirited
Defense of Gay Marriage, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 17, 2003, at A2 (former Congressman and
presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich stating "I can't, for the life of me, understand
why I'm the only one who's taking this position [in support of same-sex marriage] with
such emphasis .... We have to be courageous in protecting people's rights ... and I
don't think people should expect any less from a president").
3 World War I was catalyzed by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
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over same-sex marriage was a (now generally forgotten) state supreme court
decision.
On May 5, 1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that its marriage
statute, which limited marriage to a union between one man and one woman,
drew a classification on the basis of gender and thus was subject to strict
scrutiny under Hawaii's Constitution 4-a level of review that often spells
doom for defenders of a law. 5 While the ultimate determination of the
statute's fate was pending in the Hawaii lower courts, Congress passed the
Defense of Marriage Act which, in part, allowed states to decline to
recognize same-sex marriages or similar legal unions performed outside the
state. 6 Empowered by the federal government's green light, and to avoid the
inevitable fatality that often accompanies strict scrutiny review, the Hawaii
voters amended their constitution in 1998 to reserve questions of same-sex
marriage solely to the legislature. 7 Thus began the fervent same-sex marriage
debate.
4 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (plurality opinion). The Hawaii
Supreme Court held that Hawaii's marriage law, HAW. REv. STAT. § 572-1 (1993), drew
a classification on the basis of sex because an individual's choice of partner was limited,
by the law's very terms, based on the sex of that individual. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 60. The
case was thus remanded for consideration as to whether § 572-1 satisfied strict scrutiny.
Id. at 67-68.
5 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
(noting that strict scrutiny "has led some to wonder whether ... [it is] strict in theory, but
fatal in fact"); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 64, Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860) (noting that the State "did not even
attempt" to argue that the Massachusetts marriage statutes could survive strict scrutiny,
instead opting for arguments based on differences between same- and opposite-sex
couples). Very few laws have survived strict scrutiny review at the federal level. Notable
(and rare) exceptions include the internment of Japanese-Americans in World War II
(Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218-224 (1944)) and narrow "plus-factor"
affirmative action programs in higher education (Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 321
(2003)).
6 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996) (codified in relevant part at
28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)). Section 1738C states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
7 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage
to opposite-sex couples."). In essence, the amendment removed the question of same-sex
marriage from the ambit of equal protection violations under Hawaii's art. I, § 5. See
Baehr v. Miike, No. 20371, slip op. at 1-3 (Haw. Dec. 11, 1999), available at
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/pageserver/LegalReferences/73DFB8859867A628EAE7A
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The same-sex marriage issue, simmering since Hawaii, came to a boil
after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in 2003 that the
Massachusetts Constitution required that marriage be extended to same-sex
couples. 8 A kulturkampf ensued, with eleven states passing constitutional
amendments forbidding same-sex marriage in November 2004. 9 In
November 2006, seven more states passed their own constitutional
amendments,10 bringing the total number of states with such amendments to
twenty-six. 11
Even proponents of same-sex marriage have generally conceded that, for
the most part, these state constitutional amendments pass muster under the
United States Constitution. 12 Perhaps that is why many were surprised when
B3DC5.html (follow "December" of "1999" hyperlink; then follow "20371" hyperlink).
The Hawaii legislature subsequently revised its marriage law to define marriage as only
between a man and a woman. HAw. REv. STAT. § 572-1 (2004). For a brief timetable of
Hawaii's marriage law'on this issue, see 150 CONG. REc. H7889 (daily ed. Sept. 30,
2004) (statement of Rep. McGovern).
8 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The court held
that restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples did not even satisfy rational basis review
under the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. at 961-65. The court was careful to note,
however, that the Massachusetts Constitution often protects individual rights to a greater
extent than the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 959.
9 Kavan Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Gay Marriage Laws, STATELINE.ORG, Nov.
3, 2004, http://www.stateline.org (follow "ARCHIVES" hyperlink; then follow "Stories
from 2004" hyperlink; then follow "11/03/2004 - 50-state rundown on gay marriage
laws"). See also Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 999 n.16
(D. Neb. 2005) (noting that eleven States passed state constitutional amendments banning
same-sex marriage in the November 2004 elections). The states were Arkansas, Georgia,
Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, and
Utah.
10 Vikas Bajaj et al., The 2006 Elections: State by State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006,
at P13. The states were Colorado, Idaho, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Arizona voters rejected its proposed amendment, making it the
only state to do so.
11 See Human Rights Campaign, Statewide Marriage Prohibitions,
http://www.hrc.org/issues/statelaws.asp (select "Statewide Marriage Laws" link) (last
visited Nov. 7, 2007). While Hawaii is often mistaken as being the twenty-seventh state
with such an amendment, this is incorrect because the amendment merely reserves the
definition of marriage to the legislature rather than actually defining marriage. See supra
note 7. The twenty-six states with amendments restricting legal same-sex unions are
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Idaho, Louisiana,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
12 See, e.g., Mark Agrast, Sam Berger & Brodie Butland, Remarks of President Bush
on the Marriage Protection Amendment: Corrected and Annotated, CENTER FOR
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Judge Joseph Bataillon of the United States District Court for the District of
Nebraska struck down a Nebraska constitutional provision, Section 29,13
banning same-sex marriage, civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other
like legal relationships. In Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning,14
Judge Bataillon held that Nebraska's amendment violated the First
Amendment 15 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 16 and was an unconstitutional bill of attainder. 17 In particular,
Judge Bataillon relied on the Supreme Court decision Romer v. Evans,18
drawing parallels between Section 29 and the deprivations directed at
homosexuals in Romer to support his ruling. Judge Bataillon viewed Section
29 as going far beyond simply protecting the institution of marriage, possibly
invalidating labor contracts; 19 health insurance, adoption, and inheritance
rights; 20 and even lease agreements between roommates of the same sex.21
Thus, he reasoned, like Colorado's Amendment 2 in Romer, Section 29 was
"at once too broad and too narrow to satisfy its purported purpose of defining
marriage, preserving marriage, or fostering procreation and family life." 22
Rather, Section 29 was a "status-based" law that impermissibly sought "to
deny access to the legislative process by [homosexuals]. 23
Section 29's language is not unlike that of thirteen other state
constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, civil unions,
domestic partnerships, and other like legal relationships. 24 This, coupled with
the Supreme Court's unwillingness to enter the same-sex marriage
AMERICAN PROGRESS 4 (2006), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/
marriage%20fact%20sheet.pdf ("[S]tate constitutional amendments [banning same-sex
marriage] all over the country appear to be on firm ground."). This Note will be arguing
against this position for some of the amendments. See infra Parts III and IV.
13 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 ("Only marriage between a man and a woman shall be
valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil
union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or
recognized in Nebraska.").
14 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005).
15 ld. at 989-97.
161d. at 997-1005.
17 Id. at 1005-08.
18 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
19 Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 1000 n. 17.
20 Id. at 987-88.
21 Id. at 1005.
22 Id. at 1002.
23 Id.
24 See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text (discussing a selection of
amendments similarly worded to Nebraska's Section 29).
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debate25-or even recognize rights for homosexuals beyond that of not being
criminally punishable for private sexual conduct 26 -rendered Judge
Bataillon's courageous ruling akin to the fictional Octavia, a city suspended
over a crevasse only by a web of ropes: "Suspended over the abyss, the life
of Octavia's inhabitants is less uncertain than in other cities. They know the
net will last only so long." 27 The ropes gave way on July 14, 2006 when the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed Judge Bataillon,
holding that Section 29 need only be subject to rational basis review28 and
that there was a rational basis in encouraging heterosexual procreation and
"ideal" opposite-sex parent child-rearing by limiting relationship recognition
to opposite-sex couples. 29 The Eighth Circuit rejected a request for rehearing
en banc in September 2006,30 thus leaving Nebraska's Section 29
constitutionally intact.
While the twenty-seven states with state constitutional amendments
relating to same-sex marriage have approximately the same goal in mind, the
breadth of those amendments vary widely. Hawaii's, for example, is merely a
court-stripping provision, reserving recognition or non-recognition of same-
sex marriage to the legislature. 31 Alaska goes a bit further, defining marriage
as between a man and a woman but leaving the door open for alternative
legal arrangements such as domestic partnerships. 32 Nebraska prohibits
same-sex marriages, civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other like legal
statuses. 33 But then there are Louisiana and Oklahoma, which not only ban
25 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (noting that the case invalidating
anti-sodomy laws "does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter"). See also Lofton
v. Sec'y of Dep't of Children and Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804, 817 (1lth Cir. 2004)
(holding that Lawrence was limited to criminalization of sodomy, and thus did not imply
the unconstitutionality of a Florida law barring homosexuals from adopting children).
2 6 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
27 ITALO CALVINO, INVISIBLE CITIES 75 (William Weaver trans., Harvest Books
1974) (1972).
28 Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866-67 (8th Cir. 2006).
2 9 Id. at 867-68.
30 See G.M. Filisko, The Rites Wrangle, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2006, at 44, 47.
31 See supra note 7.
32 See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 ("To be valid or recognized in this State, a
marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.").
33 NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29. There is speculation that Section 29 actually goes further
than this. See Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002 (D. Neb.
2005) (suggesting that Section 29 extended to "many other legitimate associations,
arrangements, contracts, benefits, and policies" unrelated to personal relationships).
However, as there is no authoritative state law construction implying as much, this Note
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same-sex marriage, but forbid "the legal incidents" of marriage-assumedly
the benefits, obligations, and protections that accompany marital status-
from being conferred on same-sex couples. 34
This wide spectrum of amendments defies any categorical statement of
constitutional validity. While seemingly only the most activist (and
simultaneously unprincipled) judges would invalidate Hawaii's relatively
innocuous amendment, the fate of the other amendments is not so clear. The
amendments lend themselves not to a single categorization of same-sex
marriage bans, but rather a taxonomy based on their breadth.
This Note will examine whether the various types of state "defense of
marriage" amendments35 can withstand an equal protection challenge under
the Federal Constitution. Part II, below, will propose four basic categories
into which "defense of marriage" amendments can be placed. This
categorization not only will help to conceptualize the twenty-seven separate
amendments, but also could prove useful for precedential value should a
court ultimately invalidate a "defense of marriage" amendment. Part III will
discuss Romer v. Evans, along with some other equal protection cases of the
Supreme Court, and propose a framework to analyze each of the four
categories of amendments under equal protection based on those precedents.
Finally, Part V will apply that framework to each of the categories of
amendments and opine as to whether those particular categories would
satisfy equal protection under the United States Constitution.
II. CATEGORIZATION OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
A. Purposes of Categorization
This Part will divide the twenty-seven different "defense of marriage
amendments" into four categories based on the breadth of domestic legal
will assume that Section 29 simply halts at banning legal recognition of same-sex
marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships.
34 LA. CONST. art. XII, §15; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35.
35 This Note uses the term "'defense of marriage' amendment" to refer to any state
constitutional amendments that relate in some form to recognition of same-sex
relationships. Admittedly this term is something of a misnomer. Many of these
amendments go beyond banning same-sex marriage. See infra notes 48, 62-63 and
accompanying text. Moreover, many people believe that allowing same-sex couples to
marry would pose absolutely no threat to marriage, and in fact would be positive for the
institution (a sympathy with which this author agrees). However, this Note uses the term
because the "defense of marriage" amendments were generally passed in response to a
perceived "threat" of same-sex marriage being imposed by activist judiciaries, and thus it
seems like the most appropriate shorthand.
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statuses for same-sex partners that they prohibit. There are two main reasons
for this division.
First, categorization creates a more robust description of the amendments
and allows for greater discussion of what a proposed amendment should
cover. Very often, especially in mass media, debates over the propriety of
"defense of marriage" amendments suffer from oversimplification. 36 To
describe "defense of marriage" amendments solely in terms of banning same-
sex marriage masks the complexity which different choices of language may
occasion. For example, by its very terms, Alaska's amendment-which stops
at defining marriage as between a man and a woman 37-has a far different
import for the abilities of gay and lesbian advocacy groups to petition the
36 See Defense of Marriage Act, Gay Marriage Amendment: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of former Rep. Bob Barr, R-Ga), available at 2004 WL 630827 (F.D.C.H.)
(lamenting the reduction of the same-sex marriage debate to "vague sound-bites and
generalized talking points"). For popular media sources oversimplifying the extent of
"defense of marriage" amendments, see Rose Arce, New Jersey Court Recognizes Right
to Same-Sex Unions, CNN.CoM, Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/25/
gay.marriage/index.html ("[O]n November 7 [2006] voters in eight states will decide
whether to amend their constitutions to ban gay and lesbian couples from marrying.");
Pam Belluck, Ban on Gay Marriage Moves Closer to Ballot, Hous. CHRON., Jan. 3, 2007,
at A4 ("In November [2006], seven states approved gay-marriage bans, joining 20 that
had done so in previous elections."); Editorial, Gay Marriage Opposed, HERALD-SUN
(Durham, N.C.), Nov. 17, 2006, at A8 ("The states that voted against gay marriage [in
November 2006], most by large margins, included Virginia, Tennessee, South Carolina,
Wisconsin, Colorado, South Dakota and Idaho."). With only one or two exceptions, the
"defense of marriage" laws and amendments referred to in the articles above went
beyond same-sex marriage, banning civil unions, domestic partnerships, and, in
Oklahoma, the "incidents" of marriage. But see Sonya Geis, New Tactic in Fighting
Marriage Initiatives: Opponents Cite Effects on Straight Couples, WASH. POST, Nov. 20,
2006, at A3 (noting that of twenty-seven marriage initiatives, many "have included
language outlawing domestic partnerships").
Even the American Bar Association has fallen prey to the temptation to oversimplify
the panoply of "defense of marriage" amendments. In its official quarterly family law
publication, every state that had a "defense of marriage" law was listed simply as having
"[a] law prohibiting marriage between two people of the same sex." A White Paper: An
Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 397-402 (2004). The article prefaced its rundown of
"defense of marriage acts" with: "The purpose of state DOMAs is to prohibit same-sex
couples from marrying within the state and to provide that the state will refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages ... performed in other states." Id. at 397. While certainly
preventing same-sex marriages might be the main purpose of a "defense of marriage"
amendment, and while these amendments certainly ban same-sex marriage, many reach
into other types of same-sex unions, and sometimes even the extension of benefits
associated with marriage to same-sex couples.
37 See supra note 32.
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state legislature than Louisiana's amendment-which forbids both marriage
and "the legal incidents" thereof to same-sex couples.38 Not only is a more
precise description vital in a discussion of the legal ramifications of the
amendments, but it is essential that other states contemplating passing their
own amendments understand the myriad of options-and implications of
those options-available to them.
Second, categorization of the amendments is better for establishing legal
precedent. One of the main purposes of jurisprudence is predictability.3 9
While every case should be analyzed on its facts, cases with similar facts
should be resolved similarly. Thus, while each "defense of marriage"
amendment should be individually analyzed in order to assess its
constitutional validity, amendments with similar language and teleological
impacts should, assumedly, be constitutionally adjudicated in a similar
fashion. Likewise, should the judiciary determine that an amendment in a
certain category is constitutional, those amendments in less restrictive
categories should generally be deemed constitutional as well. For example, if
the Supreme Court determined that Nebraska's Section 29 (which bans same-
sex marriage, civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other like legal
statuses) satisfies equal protection, then it should hold that Alaska's
amendment (which only bans same-sex marriage) satisfies equal protection
as well.
These advantages being established, the four proposed categories are set
out below.
38 See supra note 34.
39 See, e.g., Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 (1980)
(opinion of Stevens, J.) (noting that stare decisis "serves the broader societal interests in
evenhanded, consistent, and predictable application of legal rules"); Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258, 284 (1972) (adhering to a prior, vilified decision exempting professional
baseball from antitrust laws out of concern for consistency and predictability in future
decisions); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 753 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is
crucial to look at precedent applying the relevant legal rule in similar factual
circumstances. Such cases give government officials the best indication of what conduct
is unlawful in a given situation."); MARK TEBBIT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 24 (2000) (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: "[T]he prophecies of
what the judges will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the
law."), id. ("[F]or all practical purposes the law on any given issue actually consists only
in the best predictions that well-informed lawyers can make about the way in which a
case will be decided.").
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B. Categorization of State Constitutional Amendments
1. Category . Court-Stripping Amendments
This type of "defense of marriage" amendment does not codify a position
on same-sex marriage; it simply reserves the question exclusively to the state
legislature. Hawaii is the only state, thus far, to have enacted a Category I
amendment. Hawaii's amendment reads: "The legislature shall have the
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." 40 Hawaii subsequently
amended its marriage laws to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples
only.41 Category I amendments not only allow for the state legislature to
establish same-sex marriage or alternative institutions for same-sex
couples-such as civil unions and domestic partnerships 42-but they even
seem to preserve a state supreme court's authority to demand that the
benefits of marriage be accorded to same-sex couples, even if not the
institution of marriage itself.43 Category I amendments are by far the least
burdensome restrictions for same-sex marriage advocates, for they still allow
gay and lesbian advocacy groups to petition the legislature, and they allow a
full range of options for legally recognizing same-sex relationships.
40 HAW. CONST. art. I, §23.
41 HAw. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (Supp. 2005).
42 Indeed, Hawaii has created a "reciprocal beneficiary relationship" for same-sex
couples, which grants to them the traditionally marital benefits of inheritance without a
will, the ability to sue for wrongful death of the reciprocal beneficiary, hospital visitation
and health care decisions, consent to postmortem examinations, loan eligibility, property
rights (including joint tenancy), tort liability, and protection under Hawaii's domestic
violence laws. HAw. REV. STAT. § 572C-1-C-7 (Supp. 2005); Human Rights Campaign,
Hawaii Marriage/Relationship Recognition Law, http://www.hrc.org/issues/898.htm
(listing benefits).
43 Cf Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (mandating that same-sex
couples be able to obtain the same "statutory benefits, protections, and security incident
to marriage under Vermont law" under the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont
Constitution, although not mandating that the institution of marriage be extended to
same-sex couples); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 220-21 (N.J. 2006) (holding that
denial of "financial and social benefits and privileges" of marriage to same-sex couples
violated the New Jersey Constitution, but reserving to the legislature the means of giving
same-sex couples those benefits and privileges); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 977-78 (Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Goodridge
majority improperly equated the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage
with civil marriage itself). While it is true that none of these states had "defense of
marriage" amendments when their respective cases were decided, it is difficult to see how
an amendment worded as Hawaii's-which reserves only marriage, but not its benefits
and privileges, to the legislature-would be exempt from judicial review absent judicial
construction indicating as much.
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2. Category I." Marriage Definition Amendments
Amendments in this category define only marriage itself as being
between one man and one woman. Some are worded very simply, such as
Alaska's:
To be valid or recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between
one man and one woman.44
Other amendments are longer and more precise, but carry the exact same
import. For example, Mississippi's Constitution reads:
Marriage may take place and may be valid under the laws of this State only
between a man and a woman. A marriage in another State or foreign
jurisdiction between persons of the same gender, regardless of when the
marriage took place, may not be recognized in this State and is void and
unenforceable under the laws of this State.4 5
Regardless of the wording, these amendments, by their plain language, create
an opposite-sex definition of marriage. Importantly, they leave open
alternatives-legislative and judicial-that confer some or all marital
benefits to same-sex couples, such as civil unions or domestic partnerships. 46
Category II amendments are the second most popular type of "defense of
marriage" amendment, adopted by nine states.47
44 ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25.
45 MISS. CONST. art. 14 § 263A.
46 There are no examples of a Category II state having civil unions, domestic
partnerships, or some other alternative legal status for same-sex couples. However,
Connecticut, which limits marriage to opposite-sex couples by statute, CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 46b-38nn (2006), also has created civil unions for same-sex couples that confer the
same benefits and privileges as marriage, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-38aa-38pp (2006).
There does not seem to be any particular reason why Connecticut could not have civil
unions were section 46b-38nn in Connecticut's state constitution rather than its statute
books.
47 In addition to Alaska and Mississippi, the remaining states are Colorado (COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 31), Kansas (KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16), Missouri (MO. CONST. art. I,
§ 33), Montana (MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7), Nevada (NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21), Oregon
(OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a), and Tennessee (TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18). The reach of the
Kansas amendment is debatable. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that it
forbids civil unions and domestic partnerships as well. See Human Rights Campaign,
State Prohibitions on Marriage for Same-Sex Couple, supra note 11 (marking Kansas as
having language "that does, or may, affect other legal relationships"). However, the
Kansas amendment states in its fourth sentence that "[n]o relationship, other than a
marriage, shall be recognized by the state as entitling the parties to the rights or incidents
of marriage." KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16 (emphasis added). The use of the word
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3. Category Il." Amendments that Ban Same-Sex Marriage and
Comparable Statuses
This category is by far the largest, containing fourteen states.4 8 The
language of Category III amendments widely varies, although none of the
amendments are particularly verbose or convoluted. Idaho's is probably the
simplest, totaling a mere twenty-three words:
A marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic legal union
that shall be valid or recognized in this state.49
Category III is also the most diverse category because it is sometimes
unclear how far Category III amendments actually extend. All Category III
amendments ban civil unions, as civil unions are more or less marriage by
another name.50 However, while some Category III amendments clearly ban
domestic partnerships and like legal statuses that grant some marital
benefits, 51 it is not entirely clear that all of them do. For example, the Texas
amendment states:
"recognize," as opposed to "perform" or otherwise using a disjunctive with a word
involving Kansas state action, implies more that Kansas was avoiding having to give
recognition to civil unions, domestic partnerships, or some other type of same-sex union
performed outside the jurisdiction rather than placing a limit on its own legislature. Cf
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28 (stating that marriage is the only "legal union that shall be
valid or recognized in this state" (emphasis added)). As the Kansas state courts have not
yet interpreted this provision, its placement in Category II or III is ultimately a matter of
guesswork. For the above reason, however, I elected to place it in Category II.
48 The states are Alabama (ALA. CONST. amend. 774), Arkansas (ARK. CONST.
amend. 83), Georgia (GA. CONST. art. I, § V), Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28),
Kentucky (Ky. CONST. § 233A), Michigan (MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25), Nebraska (NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 29), North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28), Ohio (OHIO CONST. art.
XV, § 11), South Dakota (S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9), Texas (TEx. CONST. art. I, § 32),
Utah (UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29), Virginia (VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A), and Wisconsin
(WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13). For discussion on why Kansas has not been placed in
Category III, see footnote 47, supra.
49 IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28.
50 See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Federal Marriage Amendment: Unnecessary, Anti-
Federalist, and Anti-Democratic, 2006 CATO INST. 1, 15, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa570.pdf (arguing that civil unions are to civil marriage
what a "navy" is to an "armada").
51 Examples of amendments that clearly ban domestic partnerships and like legal
statuses would include Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29), Georgia (GA. CONST. art. I,
§ IV), and Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28).
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(a) Marriage in this state shall consist only of the union of one man and one
woman. (b) This state or a political subdivision of this state may not create
or recognize any legal status identical or similar to marriage. 52
Similarly, Kentucky's amendment states:
Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or
recognized as a marriage in Kentucky. A legal status identical or
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not
be valid or recognized.5 3
It is questionable whether domestic partnerships are truly "similar to
marriage," never mind "substantially similar to ... marriage," because of
their limited reach. While previous courts and commentators have cited a
veritable laundry list of state benefits and protections that accompany
marriage, 54 domestic partnerships and reciprocal beneficiaries have enjoyed
only a limited number of these.55 Thus, it remains unclear whether
amendments phrased like those of Texas or Kentucky go so far as to prohibit
legislatively created domestic partnerships or reciprocal beneficiaries.
This Note will assume that Category III amendments generally prohibit
domestic partnerships, reciprocal beneficiaries, and similar legal statuses.
There are three main reasons for this assumption. First, while some Category
III amendments are murky as to whether they ban domestic partnerships and
52 TEx. CONST. art. I, § 32.
53 Ky. CONST. § 233A.
54 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-56 (Mass.
2003) (citing a lengthy list of benefits and protections accorded to married couples; some
of the more important ones include joint state income tax filing, automatic inheritance
rights under intestacy statutes, entitlement of wages owed to deceased employees, right to
share the medical policy of one's spouse, access to veterans' spousal benefits and
preferences, equitable division of marital property on divorce, right to bring claims for
wrongful death, presumption of legitimacy of children, evidentiary rights such as not
being required to testify against one's spouse, automatic "family member" preference to
make medical decisions for an incompetent spouse, and predictable rules of child custody
and visitation).'See also Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (N.Y. 2006) (listing
marriage benefits under New York law); Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Comish, Note, A
More Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances,
92 COLuM. L. REv. 1164, 1167 (1992) (noting that marriage status imposes support
obligations on the parties and also legally affects, among other things, workers'
compensation, unemployment compensation, the right to bring tort actions for wrongful
death or loss of consortium, legal presumptions in inheritance, and communications
privileges).
55 See infra note 153 (listing benefits associated with Maine's domestic
partnerships).
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the like, most of them clearly do. Thus, a general constitutional analysis of
Category III is best served by an appraisal of what Category III amendments
generally ban, rather than the exception.
Second, the assumption avoids a complicated interpretative analysis over
whether domestic partnerships and the like are really "similar to" marriage. 56
That is properly an inquiry for state courts to resolve, and one which could
constitute another legal academic article in and of itself. The reader here
would be better served by a constitutional analysis of amendments banning
domestic partnerships rather than a textual exegesis of numerous
constitutional provisions.
Finally, the assumption is reasonable in and of itself. Many individuals
see domestic partnerships as the state approving and providing assistance for
same-sex relationships-approval and assistance which constitute the very
goal of marriage in the opposite-sex context. 57 Moreover, the assumption
56 It is worthy to note, however, that the only Category III state court to pass on the
question (a Michigan court of appeals) determined that local domestic partnership laws-
which provide only health benefits to municipal employees rather than more wide-
ranging benefits of state domestic partnership laws-violated the Michigan "defense of
marriage" amendment because domestic partnerships were "similar" to marriage. Nat'l
Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 732 N.W.2d 139, 151 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007).
See id. at 144 (noting that no other state court had occasion to determine whether a state
amendment forbidding a "similar union" prohibited local domestic partnerships as well).
The court of appeals found that the requirements to obtain a domestic partnership were
almost identical to receiving a marriage, and local domestic partnership ordinances
represented a legal recognition of a same-sex relationship entered into by both parties.
Accordingly, the court determined that domestic partnerships were sufficiently similar to
marriage, and Michigan's amendment therefore prohibited it. See id. at 149-51. The
Michigan Constitution states in part that "the union of one man and one woman in
marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any
purpose." MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25 (emphasis added).
57 See, e.g., Terence P. Jeffrey, Rudy's a No-Go, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Feb. 6, 2007,
http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MjUzZjU2NjE3Zj mYzVjN2ExMDhkNDZkOWEx
ODcyZDU= (decrying "a climate where same-sex couples are given the same legal status
as married couples, whether the resulting arrangements are candidly called 'same-sex
marriages,' or are semantically papered-over with terms such as 'civil unions' or
'domestic partnerships"'); Joel Connelly, Let's Keep Compassion in Partnership Debate,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 5, 2007, at BI (quoting Gary Randall of the Faith
and Freedom Network as opposing domestic partnerships because they are aimed at
"authenticating a lifestyle that is historically out-of-step with society and clearly in
violation of biblical teaching"); Sean Cockerham, Gay Couples May Get Legal Rights:
Domestic Partner Bill Advances, HERALD NEWS (Passaic County, N.J.), Feb. 13, 2007, at
A14 ("[O]pponents of the domestic partnership bill argue that ... the measure is a major
step that would ultimately lead to the legalization of gay marriage."); John Stamper, Ban
on Domestic Partner Benefits Fails, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Mar. 8, 2007, at Al
(quoting a Kentucky citizen as saying that a proposed domestic partnership bill "is just a
back door to the gay marriage thing").
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preserves a clear delineation between the categories. There is a strong
argument that civil unions are really marriage by another name. 58 This being
the case, refusing to assume that Category III amendments-which clearly
ban more than simply same-sex marriage--extend beyond civil unions would
have the effect of collapsing Categories II and III into an Uber-Category that
renders a general analysis improper at best and impossible at worst. This in
turn would provide for little in the way of predictability, an important
function of constitutional jurisprudence. 59
Thus, for purposes of proposing an approach to constitutional analysis of
the various categories, this Note will assume that Category III amendments
ban same-sex marriage, civil unions, domestic partnerships, and like legal
statuses.
4. Category IV: Amendments Banning Recognition and the Legal
Incidents Thereof
Category V amendments, while only two in number, 60 are the most
extreme amendments-and also generally the most horribly and ambiguously
drafted.61 They not only ban same-sex marriage, but forbid extension of "the
legal incidents thereof' to same-sex couples. The relevant language from
both amendments is worth quoting directly. Louisiana's amendment declares
in part:
No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall construe this constitution
or any state law to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be
conferred upon any member of a union other than the union of one man and
one woman.62
58 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
59 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
60 States with Category IV amendments are Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15)
and Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35).
61 See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (quoting Category IV amendments
and explaining interpretative difficulties due to their textual language).
62 LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15. One might argue that the quoted language, by
forbidding the legal incidents to be conferred upon a member of a union (which
assumedly means a union recognized by state law) entails that Louisiana's amendment
should really only be a Category III amendment. However, this type of a reading would
not account for the sentence following the quoted language: "A legal status identical or
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or
recognized." Id. As per the rule against surplusage, the quoted language must be given
meaning independent of this sentence. Thus, the more plausible reading is that the
language quoted in the text above forbids the incidents of marriage-the benefits and
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Similarly, Oklahoma's amendment states in part:
Neither this Constitution nor any other provision of law shall be construed
to require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
unmarried couples or groups.63
Taking the statutory language at face value, Category IV amendments
seem to ban domestic partnerships and conferral of individual benefits
associated with marriage-such as the right to make medical decisions for
one's incompetent partner or to receive health benefits as the partner of a
government employee.64
In short, "defense of marriage" amendments can, as a general rule, be
classified taxonomically into four categories based on their breadth. On a
scale of severity in terms of what they prohibit, Category I amendments are
relatively innocuous, whereas Category IV amendments are the most
restrictive because they even foreclose conferring individual benefits to
protections given to married couples-from being conferred on same-sex couples based
on existing state law, whereas the following sentence quoted in this footnote forbids the
legislature from creating an exception to that rule through forming domestic partnerships
or other like legal statuses.
63 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35. While one might argue that use of the word "construe"
implies that this amendment merely restricts courts from interpreting law to require that
same-sex couples be granted incidents of marriage, such an interpretation seems too
narrow. In addition to the judiciary, executive officials, individual legislators, and local
governments all "construe" laws in order to discern what is required of them and others.
For Oklahoma to forbid the courts from interpreting a law as granting incidents of
marriage to same-sex couples, but to allow mayors and local city councils to do so, is
counterproductive and ignores the political realities against which the amendment was
passed, such as the Mayor Gavin Newsom fiasco in San Francisco or the similar actions
of commissioners in Benton County, Oregon. See Lee Romney, Defiant San Francisco
Marries Dozens of Same-Sex Couples, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 13, 2004, at Al (describing
Mayor Newsom's issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples in contravention of
California's marriage laws); Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 33 Cal. 4th
1055, 1069-1074 (2004) (same, but in greater detail); Mark Larabee & Jeff Mapes,
Benton Stops All Marriage Licensing, OREGONIAN, Mar. 23, 2004, at Al (describing how
the Benton County, Oregon commissioners refused to issue any marriage licenses
because they believed that Oregon's marriage statutes were unconstitutional). Louisiana's
amendment, although using the "construe" language, avoids Oklahoma's potential
linguistic problem by explicitly forbidding "official[s] or court[s]" from extending
marriage or its legal incidents to same-sex couples. See supra note 62 and accompanying
text.
64 It is possible that this reading goes beyond the legislative intent in passing those
amendments. However, such is not clear from the language of the amendments
themselves. Any reigning in of the amendments' language must be done through an
authoritative construction by state courts-construction that, to date, is lacking. Thus, this
Note will assume the interpretation given in the text above.
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same-sex couples. The remainder of this Note will refer to "defense of
marriage" amendments by these category designations where appropriate.
However, before analyzing whether amendments in each of Categories I-IV
would survive an equal protection challenge, an equal protection framework
must first be created. The next Part in this Note will attempt to do precisely
that, focusing on Romer v. Evans and the Court's political restructuring
cases.
III. ROMER V. EVANS: A VIABLE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING EQUAL
PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO "DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE" AMENDMENTS
In 1992, Colorado enacted an amendment to its state Constitution
through referendum. That amendment, "Amendment 2," stated, in relevant
part:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments,
nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school
districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or
entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status,
quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. 65
The practical effect of the amendment was, at minimum, to repeal anti-
discrimination ordinances in Colorado municipalities that forbade
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 66 Amendment 2 also
forbade protective measures on the basis of sexual orientation by legislative,
executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government. 67 In a
six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court invalidated Amendment 2 under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that it
"lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate state interests." 68
65 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
66 Indeed, the Court noted that the anti-discrimination ordinances in the cities of
Aspen and Boulder and the County of Denver were, in large part, the "impetus" for
Amendment 2. Id. at 623-24.
67 Id. at 624. Although the Romer Court hypothesized that Amendment 2 could
potentially deprive homosexuals of the protection of generally applicable laws and
policies, rather than merely specific protections, it found such a determination
unnecessary. The Court held that even a narrow construction of Amendment 2-the one
given in the text above-failed to satisfy equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 630.
68 Id. at 632.
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Romer's broad language and elusive demeanor render it difficult to
discern exactly what it means as a legal precedent.69 Nonetheless, it
represents the first major Supreme Court victory for gays and lesbians.70
Moreover, the often broad language of the majority opinion may have
important ramifications, offering many possibilities for future equal
protection challenges in a variety of areas.71
This Part will argue that Romer represents the proper framework under
which the various categories of "defense of marriage" amendments should be
analyzed. Section A, below, will give a brief overview of the Court's
majority opinion. Section B will argue that Romer should be given a
"localist" reading, whereby the political restructuring effect of Colorado's
Amendment 2 is dispositive in Romer's holding. Finally, drawing on the
previous analyses, Section C will provide a framework in which to analyze
the constitutionality of "defense of marriage" amendments.
A. Inexplicable by Anything but Animus-Romer's Holding
The Romer Court began its opinion by describing the effects of
Amendment 2. Amendment 2 repealed existing anti-discrimination
ordinances adopted in various Colorado municipalities 72 and prohibited the
adoption of similar protections for gays and lesbians by any legislative,
executive, or judicial action at any level of government in Colorado. 73 Thus,
homosexuals, but no others, were "forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy
or may seek without constraint"; in order to secure protection for themselves,
69 Several commentators have expressed puzzlement over Romer's reasoning. See,
e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley 's Cities: Traces of Local Constitutionalism,
147 U. PA. L. REv. 487, 586-87 (1999) ("Romer is a notably obscure opinion, and it is
therefore difficult to attribute a single rationale to it."); Richard C. Schragger, Cities as
Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147, 169 (2005)
(noting that many commentators have found Romer's reasoning "opaque" and evidencing
"nothing more than a distaste for overt discrimination against homosexuals"); Louis M.
Seidman, Romer's Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996
SUP. CT. REv. 67, 73 (1996) ("No one can write confidently about what Romer 'means'
because its ultimate meaning is yet to be determined by future judges and litigants.").
70 See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 69, at 67-68 (labeling Romer the "first major
Supreme Court victory in the history of the republic" for gays and lesbians).
71 Id. Indeed, Judge Bataillon relied almost exclusively on Romer in striking down
Nebraska's Section 29 on equal protection grounds in Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc.
v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005).
72 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24.
73 Id. at 624; see also id. at 629 ("Amendment 2 ... operates to repeal and forbid all
laws or policies providing specific protection for gays or lesbians from discrimination by
every level of Colorado government.").
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they were forced either to re-amend the state constitution again or lobby for
generally applicable laws. 74
Government being open on impartial terms to all citizens is "[c]entral
both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's guarantee of
equal protection." 75 Yet, the Court found, open government was denied to
homosexuals, but no other groups, through Amendment 2's imposition of a
"broad and undifferentiated disability. '76 Thus, Amendment 2 was "so
discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seem[ed]
inexplicable by anything but animus toward[s] [homosexuals]." 77 A simple
desire to harm a politically unpopular group-including by denying them
access to the political process to gain legal protections available to all other
individuals-is not a legitimate interest.78 Accordingly, the Court struck
down Amendment 2 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
B. At Every Level of Government: Romer's "Localist'" Interpretation
As noted earlier, Romer's broad language makes any one reading of the
case particularly difficult.79 However, there appear to be two basic factors
that account for Romer's result: (1) Amendment 2 imposed a broad disability
on a single group; and (2) Amendment 2 impermissibly restructured the
political process in order to disadvantage homosexuals, including with
respect to matters of local concern-that is, while other groups could petition
their local governments or the state government for protective laws,
homosexuals first had to repeal Amendment 2. The first factor is hardly
disputable-the Court explicitly said it employed that factor.80 The "localist"
interpretation of Romer inherent in the second factor, however, is more
controversial. The Supreme Court has ruled that a state cannot define the
governmental decisionmaking structure solely on the basis of whether one
74 Id. at 631 ("They can obtain specific protection against discrimination only by
enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State Constitution or perhaps ... by
trying to pass helpful laws of general applicability.").
75 Id. at 633.
7 6 Id. at 632.
77 Id.
78 Romer, 517 U.S. at 634; see also Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973).
79 See supra note 69.
80 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 ("[Amendment 2] impos[ed] a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group.").
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falls within a particular group in cases like Hunter v. Erickson81 and
Washington v. Seattle School District.82 Because Amendment 2 reallocated
anti-discrimination legislation to the state constitutional level for
homosexuals, but no other groups, many believed that Romer would be
decided under the Supreme Court's restructuring precedents-indeed, the
parties briefed extensively about whether those precedents should decide
Romer.83 Yet nowhere in Romer did the Supreme Court cite any of its
political restructuring cases. Some commentators have thus posited
interpretations that ignore any localist dimensions of the opinion,84 while
81 393 U.S. 385 (1969). In Hunter, in response to the Akron, Ohio city council
enacting a fair housing ordinance, Akron voters amended the city charter to prevent "any
ordinance dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in housing without
the approval of the majority of the voters of Akron." Id. at 386. Thus,' those seeking to
prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or ancestry had to amend
the city charter, whereas those seeking to prohibit discrimination for any other reason
needed only to appeal to the city council. The Court held this an impermissible political
restructuring because the State was disadvantaging a particular group in the political
process, id. at 393, which violated the principle of "providing a just framework within
which the diverse political groups in our society may fairly compete," id. at 393 (Harlan,
J., concurring).
82 458 U.S. 457 (1982). In Seattle School District, Washington voters approved
Initiative 350, which stated that "no school board ... shall directly or indirectly require
any student to attend a school other than the school which is geographically nearest or
next nearest the student's ... residence." Id. at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Initiative 350 targeted desegregative busing, especially Seattle's busing program to
remedy de facto segregation, but still allowed for "maximum flexibility" in school
assignments for non-racial reasons. Id. at 462-63. The Court struck Initiative 350 down
because, rather than "allocate governmental power on the basis of any general principle,"
it "use[d] the racial nature of an issue to define the governmental decisionmaking
structure." Id. at 470 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Cf Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 540-42 (1982)
(upholding Proposition I, which forbade state courts from enacting busing remedies
unless the federal courts had jurisdiction to do so, on the grounds that the political
decisionmaking structure was not altered on the basis of a particular group); Gordon v.
Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 5 (1971) (upholding West Virginia's mandatory referendum
requirements for bonded indebtedness on the grounds that the law "applie[d] equally to
all bond issues" and did not single out the issue of bonded indebtedness with respect to an
"independently identifiable group").
83 See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 16-23, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
(No. 94-1039) (arguing that the case should be decided on the basis of the Court's
political restructuring cases, especially Hunter and Seattle School District).
84 See Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 89, 94 (1997) (stating that the decisional framework for Romer was that a
law is invalid if it "targets a narrowly defined group and then imposes upon it disabilities
that are so broad and undifferentiated as to bear no discernible relationships to any
legitimate governmental interest"); Richard F. Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite of
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others have argued that a localist interpretation of Romer is simply
incorrect. 85 However, more commentators have signed on to the idea that
Romer was decided in large part because of the political restructuring caused
by Amendment 2-more specifically, that Amendment 2 subverted
legislative choices traditionally left to local governments. 86 There are several
reasons as to why this interpretation is the most plausible.
First, Romer itself contains numerous references to localism. Noting
early in the Romer opinion that three municipalities had passed anti-
discrimination ordinances, 87 the Court emphasized that Amendment 2
repealed those ordinances, forbade the enactment of others "by every level of
Colorado government, '' 88 and "prohibit[ed] all legislative, executive or
judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect
[homosexuals]." 89 It is difficult to see why the Court would repeatedly
emphasize that localities could no longer protect their own interests with
Romer and the Eminent Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Response to
Professor Koppelman, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 147, 147-48 (1997) ("Koppelman's
summary of the 'rule of decision' of Romer is absolutely correct."); Daniel Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (1996) (stating
that Romer was decided on the "pariah principle"--that is, "the government cannot brand
any group as unworthy to participate in civil society.... [or deprive them] of civil
equality based on immutable characteristics such as sexual orientation"). While these
sources do not explicitly contradict a localist interpretation, and in fact may be entirely
compatible with even a strong localist reading of Romer, they nonetheless do not consider
localism an important dimension to the case.
85 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case
for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL. 187, 219-220 (2005) (calling a localist interpretation
of Romer "mistaken" and citing the practical difficulty of "ill-equipped" courts to "act as
babysitters" to preserve local authority).
86 See, e.g., David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2257, 2363
n.444 (2003) (arguing that Romer represents an example of the judiciary "deploy[ing]
local power in the service of a broader civil rights policy agenda"); Barron, The Promise
of Cooley's Cities, supra note 69, at 586-94 (1999) (noting the local constitutionalism
inherent in the Romer majority opinion); Kristen Boike, Note, Rethinking Gender
Opportunities: Nontraditional Sports Seasons and Local Preferences, 39 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 597, 601-603 (2006) (noting Romer's localist framework in vindicating
municipalities' rights to enact laws protecting gays and lesbians); Lawrence Rosenthal,
Romer v. Evans as the Transformation of Local Government Law, 31 URB. LAW. 257,
262-68 (1999) (same); Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized
Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1410-11 (1997) (emphasizing underlying localist
importance of Romer); Schragger, supra note 69, at 168-72 (2005) (arguing that a
localist interpretation is the most reasonable explanation of the Court's standard of
review).
87 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996).
88 Id. at 629.
89 Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
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respect to gays and lesbians if political restructuring was unimportant to its
decision. Moreover, the majority opinion contains several passages that
nearly mimic political restructuring language from Seattle School District
and Hunter, indicating that the Court was drawing on ideas in those cases to
decide Romer.90
Second, during oral argument several Justices expressed concern over
Amendment 2's political restructuring. Justice Kennedy was the most overt,
saying to counsel for petitioners that the question was not simply one of
reservation of power to state or local government, but the "discrimination in
the reservation of the subject matter, or a discrimination in the ... exercise of
legislative power."91 He thus framed the issue of the case as whether there
was a "rational basis for determining that affirmative protection for
homosexuals cannot be dealt with at a certain level, whereas affirmative
protection for [other groups] can be." 92 Justice Stevens saw the case in a
similar light, and he pushed counsel for petitioner to explain what the rational
basis would be for people outside of Aspen telling Aspen residents that they
could not pass certain protective measures. 93 Justice Ginsburg, meanwhile,
saw local protections for homosexuals as akin to local laws allowing for
female suffrage prior to adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment, and she
expressed her discomfort with disabling gay and lesbian rights activists from
initiating a local civil rights movement.94 In short, as evidenced by the oral
argument, many individual Justices seemed to view the case in localist terms,
and it only seems reasonable that those viewpoints seeped into the Romer
opinion.
Finally, the later case of Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc.
v. City of Cincinnati indicates that Romer should be given a political
90 For example, the Romer Court noted that "[c]entral [to equal protection] is the
principle that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who
seek its assistance." Id. at 633. The Court also stated that "[a] law declaring that in
general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid
from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal
sense." Id. Cf Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) ("[T]he State may [not]
disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in [sic]
its behalf."); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982) ("[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment ... reaches 'a political structure that treats all individuals as
equals,' yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to place special
burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation." (internal
citations omitted)).
91 Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-
1039), available at 1995 WL 605822.
92 Id. at 21-23.
93 Id. at 20.
9 4 1d. at 14.
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restructuring interpretation.95 That case involved a challenge to an
amendment, Article XII, to the Cincinnati City Charter. Article XII forbade
the City and its boards and commissions from adopting "any ordinance,
regulation, rule or policy which provides that [sexual orientation or conduct]
provides a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected
status, quota preference or other preferential treatment. '96 The charter
amendment was passed as a reaction to two separate city ordinances that
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in city hiring
practices and in private employment, housing, and public accommodations. 97
In Equality Foundation I, the Sixth Circuit held that the initiative did not
violate equal protection, and the decision was appealed to the Supreme
Court.98 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further
consideration in light of Romer.99 The Sixth Circuit affirmed its original
decision the next year. 00
In Equality Foundation II, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed its earlier
disposition based on a localist reading of Romer. In distinguishing Article
XII from Colorado's Amendment 2, the Sixth Circuit found it significant that
the Cincinnati amendment reflected only a "direct expression of the local
community will on a subject of direct consequences to the voters" rather than
a political restructuring that "deprived a politically unpopular minority, but
no others, of the political ability to obtain special legislation at every level of
state government, including within local jurisdictions having pro-gay rights
majorities."l01
More importantly, in remanding Equality Foundation I to the Sixth
Circuit for further consideration, the Supreme Court itself recognized
Romer's localist dimension. First, the three Justices dissenting from grant of
certiorari--Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas--did so
because of Romer's localist dimension. 10 2 Moreover, if the remaining
95 For background of the case and the ultimate disposition at each stage of the
appellate history, see Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128
F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) (Equality Foundation I1), cert. denied 525 U.S. 943 (1998).
9 6 1d. at 291.
9 7 Id. at 291-92.
98 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th
Cir. 1995) (Equality Foundation 1), vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
99 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001,
1001 (1996); see also Equality Foundation 1H, 128 F.3d at 294.
100 Equality Foundation 11, 128 F.3d at 301.
101 Id. at 297.
102 See Equality Foundation, 518 U.S. at 1001 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Romer [held that] homosexuals in a city (or other electoral subunit) that wishes to
accord them special protection cannot be compelled to achieve a state constitutional
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Justices did not really believe that the political restructuring element of
Amendment 2 was significant to their earlier Romer opinion, they probably
would have reversed the Sixth Circuit in a minimalist per curium opinion
referencing Romer rather than remand the case-just like the Court has done
in other civil and political rights contexts. 10 3 After all, Cincinnati's
amendment was worded nearly identically to and had the same practical
effect as Amendment 2, the Sixth Circuit's interpretation
notwithstanding 104-the only difference was the scope of the impact of the
amendments on the political process for gays and lesbians and their
supporters. Instead, the Court remanded the case and then denied certiorari in
1998 after the Sixth Circuit affirmed itself.10 5
In short, the political restructuring precedents of the Supreme Court, the
views of the 'Justices, the language of Romer's majority opinion, the Sixth
Circuit's Equality Foundation II opinion, the Supreme Court's actions in the
Equality Foundation cases, and the writings of the majority of commentators
indicate that a proper interpretation of Romer requires a political
amendment .... [Equality Foundation] involves a determination by ... the lowest
electoral subunit that does not wish to accord homosexuals special protection.").
103 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REv. 1, 32 (1959) (noting a series of post-Brown per curium opinions, citing
Brown, that held "that the fourteenth amendment forbids all racial lines in legislation");
JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTFrUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS--QUESTIONS 1215
(10th ed. 2006) ("After Brown, the Court, in summary per curium decisions citing Brown,
consistently held invalid state imposed racial segregation in other public facilities .... );
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FrST AMENDMENT 204 (2d ed. 2003) (noting a series of
per curium reversals of convictions for sale or exhibition of allegedly obscene materials
after Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
104 Indeed, the operative language of the two provisions seems almost boilerplate.
Amendment 2 forbade "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships" from forming the "basis of or entitl[ing] any person or class of persons to
have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). Article XII forbade
"homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship[s]" from
"provid[ing] a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or protected status,
quota preference or other preferential treatment." Equality Foundation II, 128 F.3d at
296. While the "other preferential treatment" language in Article XII seems more
innocuous than Amendment 2's "claim of discrimination," Article XII still nullified the
anti-discrimination ordinances passed by the Cincinnati City Council, and thus had the
same effect on the ability of gays and lesbians to seek legal protection. In short, there
does not appear to be a substantial difference between the two provisions in their
language or effect beyond that of the levels of government that they affect. Nonetheless,
the Sixth Circuit inexplicably held that Article XII, in contrast to Amendment 2, merely
prohibited special protections for homosexuals. See id. at 296-97.
105 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943,
943 (1998).
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restructuring element. Thus, Romer's holding is best understood as resting on
both the broad and undifferentiated harm to homosexuals and Amendment
2's removal of decisionmaking authority from the local governments on a
matter with which they were directly concerned.
C. A Romer Framework for Analyzing "Defense of Marriage"
Amendments
The foregoing analysis indicates that Colorado's Amendment 2 was
unconstitutional for two reasons. First, Amendment 2 "inflict[ed] on
[homosexuals] immediate, continuing, and real injuries"'1 6 in a broad and
undifferentiated way. However, this alone does not explain why Amendment
2 was unconstitutional. As noted earlier, Cincinnati's Article XII inflicted
similar harm on homosexuals; yet, the Supreme Court did not summarily
reverse the Sixth Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit did not strike down Article
XII after the case was remanded. 10 7 Hence, the second factor: Amendment 2
restructured the political process solely for homosexuals by interfering with
local community preferences. These two factors, combined, seem to more
fully explain the otherwise foggy language of Romer.
Equal protection challenges to state "defense of marriage" amendments
should be similarly analyzed under these two factors. Thus, a state
constitutional amendment will satisfy equal protection if it does not: (1)
inflict an "immediate, continuing, and real" harm on homosexuals, or (2)
restructure the political process in such a way as to interfere with local
community preferences over traditionally local matters. Conversely, a state
constitutional amendment will violate equal protection if it inflicts serious
harm in an undifferentiated way and distorts the political process by
interfering with local community preferences.
This framework will be used to analyze each of the categories of
"defense of marriage" amendments laid out earlier in this Note,10 8 and the
analysis follows below.
106 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
107 See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
108 See Part II, supra.
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IV. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK: RESOLUTION OF EQUAL PROTECTION
CHALLENGES TO "DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE"
AMENDMENTS BY CATEGORY
Part III, supra, created a framework involving Romer to analyze state
"defense of marriage" amendments. This Part will apply that framework to
each of Categories I-IV in the four subsections below.
A. Category I Amendments
Category I amendments reserve the definition of marriage solely to the
legislature. Thus, they merely strip courts of jurisdiction to hear cases
regarding extension of marriage to same-sex couples-the legislative process
remains intact. To many, Category I amendments are so obviously
constitutional that Justice Potter Stewart's famous (or notorious) "I know it
when I see it" test seems germane. 10 9 And in fact, the Romer framework
confirms that Category I amendments are constitutional, for they neither
cause "immediate, continuing, and real injuries" 110 in a broad and
undifferentiated way, nor do they restructure the political process or intrude
upon local community preferences in matters properly left to municipal and
city governments. Each of these points will be discussed in the paragraphs
below.
First, Category I amendments do not inflict substantial harm on
homosexuals. Because Category I amendments are merely court-stripping
provisions, their only injury to homosexuals is a denial of a judicially-
mandated extension of marriage to same-sex couples-assuming that the
state court of last resort decided to rule that way in the first place. As the
legal system has been their main source of victory, the practical effect of
court-stripping amendments is to take the wind out of the sails of gay and
lesbian advocates.I' However, the legal effect of Category I amendments on
109 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice
Stewart's line was in the context of an obscenity case. While conceding that he may not
have been able "to define the kinds of material ... embraced within [obscenity]," he said
simply: "I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not
[obscene]." Id.
1 0 Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
111 No state has extended marriage to same-sex couples without a court order, and
Connecticut is the only state that has created civil unions without being judicially
required to do so. The only other two states with civil unions-Vermont and New
Jersey-did so in response to court orders demanding that the benefits, obligations, and
protections of marriage be extended to same-sex couples. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864, 889 (Vt. 1999); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006). Massachusetts
remains the only state to have same-sex marriage, a result of Goodridge v. Dep't of
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state recognition of same-sex marriage is minimal because they do not deny
marriage to same-sex couples or even require the legislature to pass on the
issue at the current time. 112 Thus, Category I amendments do not seem to
inflict immediate, continuing, or real injury to homosexuals.
Additionally, Category I amendments do not impermissibly restructure
the political process. Category I amendments are only court-stripping
provisions; thus, they leave all channels of the political process open to the
same degree as before. 113 A state legislature, acting pursuant to a Category I
amendment, is equally free to accept or reject same-sex marriage, and
advocates of same-sex marriage can appeal to the political branches on the
same grounds as any other citizen. Simply put, Category I amendments do
not "work[] [the] major reordering of the State's [marriage] decisionmaking
Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (mandating that the benefits,
protections, and obligations of marriage be conferred on same-sex couples) and Opinions
of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (holding that civil unions
were an impermissible substitute for same-sex marriage).
112 In this sense, Category I amendments are like California's Proposition I in
Crawford, which was upheld by the Supreme Court against an equal protection challenge.
Crawford, decided the same day as Seattle School District, rejected the idea "that once a
State chooses to do 'more' than the Fourteenth Amendment requires, it may never
recede." Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 535 (1982). Thus, the
Court upheld Proposition I, which banned state courts from creating desegregation
remedies unless a federal court had jurisdiction to do the same under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Currently, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require same-sex marriage.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (declining to address the issue of
"whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter"); id. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (implying that
same-sex marriage would probably not be required under the Equal Protection Clause by
saying that "Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest [for its law against same-sex
sodomy], such as ... preserving the traditional institution of marriage"); Citizens for
Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 866-869 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
Equal Protection Clause does not require invalidation of a ban on marriage, civil unions,
or domestic partnerships to same-sex couples); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298,
1305-09 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment do not require that marriage be extended to same-sex
couples); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 140-48 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (same). Thus, if
a state court were to require that marriage be extended to same-sex couples, it would be
going further than the Fourteenth Amendment. Crawford, therefore, allows the state to
recede its protections back to the Fourteenth Amendment baseline if it so desired.
113 In this sense, Category I amendments have the same legal effect as California's
Proposition I at issue in Crawford. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 535-36 ("The school
districts themselves ... remain free to adopt reassignment and busing plans to effectuate
desegregation."); id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[T]hose political mechanisms
that create and repeal the rights ultimately enforced by the courts were left entirely
unaffected by Proposition I.").
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process" 114 that the Supreme Court has considered the hallmark of
impermissible political restructuring.
In short, Category I amendments neither severely harm homosexuals nor
impermissibly reorder the political process. Decisions on same-sex marriage
are left to the political branches as before-the only difference is that the
state courts can no longer enter the debate. Because neither of the two Romer
factors are implicated, Category I amendments seem to comport with the
Equal Protection Clause.
B. Category IlAmendments
Unlike Category I amendments, Category II amendments actually set in
constitutional stone a state prohibition on same-sex marriage-one that can
be negated only by re-amending the state constitution. 115 For this reason,
Category II amendments are far more insidious to gay-rights proponents. But
despite the hardship visited upon committed same-sex couples who would
marry if given the chance, Category II amendments seem to comport with the
Equal Protection Clause because (1) in a constitutional sense, they arguably
do not inflict a broad and undifferentiated injury upon homosexual persons,
and (2) they do not interfere with local community preferences and thereby
impermissibly restructure the political process. Each of these points will be
discussed in the paragraphs below.
First, Category II amendments do not severely harm homosexuals in a
way contemplated by the Romer Court. Essential to the Romer Court's
invalidation of Amendment 2 was its "impos[ition] [of] a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group."' 116 Thus, while it is
certainly important to consider whether an injury imposed on a group is real
and lasting, it also must be sufficiently broad as to raise an inference of
animus. 117 Category II amendments, while inflicting a real injury upon
committed homosexual couples, do not inflict a substantial injury in a broad
and undifferentiated way.
Category II amendments undoubtedly forbid a certain social standing for
same-sex couples. 118 Nonetheless, Category II amendments do not impose a
114 Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457, 479 (1982).
115 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (quoting various Category H
amendments and explaining their impact).
116 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
117 See id. (stating that Amendment 2 "seems inexplicable by anything but animus
toward [homosexuals]").
118 See Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Sept.
21, 2006, at 24, 30 (arguing that creating civil unions as an alternative to marriage
"reduces the discrimination [against homosexuals], but falls far short of eliminating it.
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severe harm like that contemplated in Romer because they leave adequate
alternatives for homosexual couples. It is certainly true that marriage is, quite
possibly, "the most important relation in life,""l 9 and its intangible
importance to committed homosexual couples cannot be understated.' 20 In
addition to the personal dimension of marriage, many gay rights advocates
see same-sex marriage as the most important cornerstone in achieving full
equality for homosexuals in general society.' 21 But even recognizing all this,
while Category II amendments prevent gays and lesbians from marrying,
they do not prohibit the creation of civil unions or other legal same-sex
partnerships, nor do they forbid extending individual marital benefits to
committed same-sex couples. Therefore, gays and lesbians, while denied the
institution of marriage, could still receive the full benefits of marriage as well
as a state-conferred recognition of their relationship.
While there is much to be said for the argument that civil unions are not
marriage even though they consist of the same marital benefits, 122 the fact
remains that Category II amendments leave many other avenues open to
same-sex couples. A denial of marriage is a far cry from the absurdly
overbroad Amendment 2, which denied homosexuals even the most basic of
legal protections. 123 Thus, Category II amendments do not appear to
implicate the first Romer factor.
The institution of marriage is unique: it is a distinct mode of association and commitment
with long traditions of historical, social, and personal meaning"); Brief of Appellants at
42, Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (No. A-68-05) ("By denying [same-sex
couples] access to marriage, the State ... places individuals in same-sex relationships in
a separate and inferior legal class."); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Goodridge v.
Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860) (noting two of the
plaintiffs' desire "to be part of that larger community of married persons ... so that their
relationship is understood by the community as it is by them"); Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 21, Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 10343/04)
(quoting a plaintiff as saying: "As long as we cannot marry, we are not full citizens....
Without the right to marriage itself, we are denied full respect and dignity for our
families").
119 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
120 See supra note 118.
121 See, e.g., ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT
HOMOSEXUALITY 178-79 (1995).
122 See supra note 118 (recognizing importance of marriage as a social institution
for same-sex couples); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38nn (2006) (granting same marital
benefits, protections, and obligations to parties to a civil union).
123 Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("We find nothing special in the
protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are protections taken for granted by most
people either because they already have them or do not need them; these are protections
against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that
constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.").
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In addition, Category II amendments do not interfere with decisions
properly left to local government. Amendment 2 was struck down largely
because it interfered with local community preferences. 124 Since Colorado
allowed its municipalities to pass anti-discrimination legislation for all other
groups, the Court was especially suspicious of Amendment 2 stripping that
authority away from municipalities solely for one unpopular group of people.
By contrast, marriage has never been delegated to municipalities; it is, and
always has been, governed by the states. 125 That is not to say that states can
never delegate marriage authority to municipalities-indeed, as states are
given plenary authority to structure their governmental decisionmaking, 126 a
state could give local governments a more substantive role in determining
what qualified as a valid marriage. 127 However, it does not seem that any
124 See supra notes 87-105 and accompanying text.
125 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) ("[M]arriage is a social
relation subject to the State's police power."); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
298 (1942) ("Each state as a sovereign has a rightful and legitimate concern in the marital
status of persons domiciled within its borders."); Lockyer v. City and County of San
Francisco, 95 P.3d 459, 471 (Cal. 2004) ("[T]here can be no question but that marriage is
a matter of 'statewide concern,' rather than a 'municipal affair' .... "); Catalano v.
Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728 (Conn. 1961) ("A state has the authority to declare what
marriages of its citizens shall be recognized as valid ... ."); Lowe v. Broward County,
766 So. 2d 1199, 1205 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) ("The law of domestic relations is one
matter reserved for the state alone."); Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496, 501 (N.J.
1974) ("It has long been well settled and now stands unchallenged that marriage is a
social relationship subject in all respects to the state's police power."); Gowin v. Gowin,
292 S.W. 211, 211 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927) ("[M]arriage ... is governable by law of
the state."); Agrast, Berger & Butland, supra note 12 ("Marriage ... has always been
governed by state law .... ").
126 See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 476 (1982)
("States traditionally have been accorded the widest latitude in ordering their internal
governmental processes."); Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 289 U.S.
36, 40 (1933) ("A municipal corporation [is] created by a state for the better ordering of
government....").
127 While there do not seem to be any federal cases on point, the California Supreme
Court had occasion to address the issue of state delegation of marriage authority when
Mayor Gavin Newsom issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples in violation of
California law. See supra note 63. The court held that Mayor Newsom's actions could be
restrained because California state law reserved the issue of marriage to the state
government, with local officials only acting in a "ministerial" capacity-that is, if a
couple satisfied the state requirements for a valid marriage, local officials were obligated
to grant them a license. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 472; see also id. at 468-71 (describing
California marriage law, which reserves the definition to the state and ministerial
execution of the law to local officials). The natural implication of the California opinion,
of course, is that local officials could act in other than a "ministerial" capacity-such as a
"discretionary" one-if the California legislature decided to delegate issues of marriage
and divorce to local government.
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state has. Given that marriage is solely of state concern, municipalities have
no local interest in state marriage laws. 128 Therefore, the localist dimension
of Romer is simply not implicated--Category II amendments do not infringe
upon the proper concerns of local authorities.
In short, Category II amendments neither inflict a broad and
undifferentiated harm, nor do they impermissibly restructure the political
process. Civil marriage, while an important institution to both opposite- and
same-sex couples, has approximate alternatives. Further, marriage is solely
the province of the state, and, thus, Category II amendments cannot possibly
implicate localist concerns. Thus, Category II amendments seem to satisfy
Romer's demands of equal protection.
C. Category III Amendments
Category III amendments not only forbid legislative creation of same-sex
marriage, but they also foreclose marriage-like alternatives, such as civil
unions, domestic partnerships, and reciprocal beneficiaries. 129 However,
"marriage-like alternatives" is a very broad spectrum. For example, civil
unions provide identical state-level marital benefits, obligations, and
responsibilities to same-sex couples who enter into them. 130 By contrast,
state-level domestic partnerships and reciprocal beneficiaries only provide
some of these benefits at the state level. 131 And then there are local domestic
partnership ordinances, where the benefits can range anywhere from all local
128 One student author has suggested that municipal authorities should have the
power to refuse to follow marriage laws if they perceive those laws to be
unconstitutional. See Samuel P. Tepperman-Gelfant, Note, Constitutional Conscience,
Constitutional Capacity: The Role of Local Governments in Protecting Individual Rights,
41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 219 (2006). This naturally implies that local government
actually does have some interest in marriage policy. While his proposal is intriguing, this
Note will not address the merits or demerits of Tepperman-Gelfant's view because it has
never been adopted by any federal or state court, and thus is outside the scope of this
Note.
129 See supra notes 48-53, 56-57 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38nn (2006) ("Parties to a civil union shall
have all the same benefits, protections, and responsibilities under law ... as are granted
to spouses in a marriage, which is defined as the union of one man and one woman.").
Naturally, civil unions, or even same-sex marriage, cannot confer federal benefits upon
the parties to it. The Defense of Marriage Act defines "marriage" for federal legal
purposes as being only between a man and a woman and "spouse" as only a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or wife. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). Thus, any federal benefits
associated with marriage only apply to opposite-sex marriages. Federal law does not
confer benefits upon parties to a civil union or domestic partners.
131 See, e.g., supra note 42 (listing benefits of Hawaii's reciprocal beneficiaries).
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benefits given to married couples, 132 to only some of those benefits, 133 to
merely a domestic partnership registry with no guaranteed benefits. 134 Thus,
in order to evaluate the constitutionality of Category III amendments, effects
on both state and local benefits must be analyzed. Accordingly, Subsection 1,
below, will examine whether a "defense of marriage" amendment's
forbidding civil unions comports with equal protection under the Romer
framework described in Part III.C, above. Subsection 2 will conduct the same
inquiry with respect to domestic partnership laws, both state and local.
1. Civil Unions
As aforesaid, civil unions confer all state-level marital benefits on same-
sex couples who qualify. 135 At present, three states-Vermont, Connecticut,
and New Jersey-have civil unions for same-sex couples.' 36 While the
constitutionality of foreclosing civil unions to same-sex couples is slightly
more suspect than foreclosing marriage (as in the Category II amendments),
Category III amendments-as applied to civil unions-nonetheless do not
implicate the Romer framework. While a state constitutional ban on civil
unions inflicts immediate, continuing, and real injuries on homosexuals, the
ban does not violate equal protection because it relates to a matter that is
solely the province of the state. Thus, Category III amendments-as applied
to civil unions--do not implicate the political restructuring issues necessary
for a successful equal protection challenge under the Romer framework. Each
of these points will be discussed below.
Category III amendments' foreclosure of civil unions inflicts a
significant harm on homosexuals. By their plain terms, Category III
amendments eliminate the possibility of any parallel marital institution for
same-sex couples. This substantially harms same-sex couples. The 2000
Census reported nearly 600,000 same-sex partner households in the United
132 See, e.g., ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 215-27 (2000) (providing all benefits extended
to spouses of city employees to domestic partners).
133 See, e.g., LAGUNA BEACH, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 1.12.070, 1.12.080 (1992)
(hospital and jail visitation privileges for registered domestic partners); PHILA., PA., CrrY
CODE § 9-1103 (2004) (requiring employers to extend employee health benefits to "Life
Partners" unless employer's benefit plan is governed by ERISA).
134 See, e.g., BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE §§ 12-4-1-7 (2006) (providing for a
domestic partnership registry but no benefits); DENVER, COLO., REV. MIJN. CODE § 28-
200 (2006) (same, except referring to the status as "committed partnerships").
135 See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
136 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201-02 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38aa
(2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-28 (West 2007).
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States, 137 a number that topped 770,000 five years later. 138 The Census also
reported that a third of female same-sex households and over a fifth of male
same-sex households had children.1 39 Further, same-sex couples live in every
congressional district in the United States. 140
These couples are as much in need of the benefits and protections
associated with marriage as opposite-sex couples, and to deny those benefits
constitutes a significant hardship for them.' 41 Moreover, the hardship is
uniquely visited upon the homosexual population. Opposite-sex couples can
still receive benefits and protections by getting married-they do not need
civil unions. 142 In short, prohibitions of civil unions inflict a severe harm on
same-sex couples, but no other groups, thereby implicating the first prong of
the Romer framework.
Although Category III amendments inflict a severe harm on
homosexuals, a foreclosure on civil unions does not impermissibly
restructure the political process. The law of domestic relations has
137 See TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MARRIED-
COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, CENSUS SPECIAL REPORTS 2
(2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf.
138 GARY J. GATES, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL
POPULATION: NEW ESTIMATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1 (2006),
http://www.law.ucia.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/SameSexCouplesandGLBpopAC
S.pdf (publication by the Williams Institute of the UCLA school of law reporting data
that the number of same-sex couples grew from nearly 600,000 couples in 2000 to almost
777,000 in 2005). The study attributes the increase to a decreasing "stigma associated
with same-sex partnering and homosexuality in general." Id.
139 SIMMONS & O'CONNELL, supra note 137, at 10.
140 GATES, supra note 138, at 2.
141 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003) ("No
one disputes that the plaintiff couples are families ... and that the children they are
raising, like all children, need and should have the fullest opportunity to grow up in a
secure, protected family unit."); id. at 955 ("The benefits accessible only by way of a
marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death."); Lewis v.
Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 202 (N.J. 2006) (describing the expensive and time-consuming
practices in which same-sex couples have engaged because marital benefits were not
readily available, as well as the hardships of partners being denied privileges while the
other was hospitalized); Hemandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 32 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J.,
dissenting) ("Depriving ... children [of same-sex couples] of the benefits and protections
available to the children of opposite-sex couples is antithetical to their welfare .... ").
142 And, because marriage and its attendant benefits and protections are available to
them, it seems that opposite-sex couples do not deserve civil unions anyway. See, e.g.,
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958 ("Individuals who have the choice to marry each other and
nevertheless choose not to may properly be denied the legal benefits of marriage.").
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traditionally been the exclusive priority of the state. 143 If a state wanted to
ban marriage entirely, or eliminate civil marriage and only recognize civil
unions, it could do so under its plenary authority. 144 That is not to say that a
state could not delegate its authority to municipalities and allow them to
create civil unions-indeed, just as in the case of marriage, the state's
plenary authority to structure governmental decisionmaking also allows it to
give local government a substantive role in determining what qualifies as a
valid civil union, or even whether civil unions could be granted. 145 However,
to date no state has delegated such authority. 146 Indeed, the states that have
civil unions reserve all discretionary decisions to state authorities, relegating
local government to at most a ministerial role in granting civil union
certificates. 147
Because civil unions are not, and never have been, the domain of local
government, and because they involve a state interest in domestic relations
law, forbidding civil unions does not work an impermissible political
restructuring. Category III amendments, by prohibiting civil unions, do not
"repeal... laws or policies" of local governments, 148 nor do they "interfere[]
with the expression of local community preferences"' 149 since local
communities never had a right to express that preference in the first place. In
short, just as marriage is not a concern of local government unless the state
explicitly delegates its authority, civil unions are likewise not of local
concern. Thus, a state "defense of marriage" amendment that bans civil
unions does not restructure the political process in a way forbidden by
Romer.
143 See supra note 125 and accompanying text; Sanford N. Katz, Emerging Models
for Alternative Marriage, 33 FAM. L.Q. 663, 669 (1999) (noting that "regulat[ing]
marriage-like relationships [is] a power normally reserved to the states").
144See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957 n.14 ("[T]he State could, in theory,
abolish all civil marriage .. "); Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623,
644 (Mass. 2006) (same).
145 See supra notes 125, 143 and accompanying text.
146 See supra note 125 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 127-28 and
accompanying text.
147 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5160 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38aa-pp
(2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-2 (West 2002 & Supp. 2007).
148 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629 (1996).
149 Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289,
297 (6th Cir. 1997).
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2. Domestic Partnerships
The domestic partnership, while frequently mentioned by major media
sources in the same-sex relationship debate, 5 0 is also a very elusive concept
uncharacterizable by a single, pithy definition. Black's Law Dictionary gives
two definitions for "domestic partnership":
1. A nonmarital relationship between two persons of the same or opposite
sex who live together as a couple for a significant period of time.
2. A relationship that an employer or governmental entity recognizes as
equivalent to marriage for the purpose of extending employee-partner
benefits otherwise reserved for the spouses of employees. 15 1
While perhaps illustrative, these definitions bear little resemblance to the
actual state of domestic partnership laws in this country. 152 To begin, there
150 See, e.g., Editorial, Conserving that Compassion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2006, at
A 14 (arguing that the New Jersey Lewis v. Harris decision "was hardly activist," given
that New Jersey "had given gay couples the ability to unite in domestic partnerships");
Nation in Brief WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2006, at A19 (stating that "California recognizes
domestic partnerships, similar to civil unions in Vermont and Connecticut"); Ellen Barry,
A Same-Sex Marriage Setback: Lawmakers Allow an Initiative Banning the Unions to Go
to Voters. But the Fight Isn't Over, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2007, at A7 (noting that
"Vermont, New Jersey and Connecticut allow civil unions, and California's domestic
partnership law guarantees many of the rights of marriage").
151 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 522-23 (8th ed. 2004).
152 The first definition is only partially correct because it does not mention that
domestic partnerships are legal statuses granted by a state or local government. Further,
legal domestic partnerships usually have a cohabitation requirement in addition to a large
number of other requirements resembling the prerequisites for marriage. See Bowman &
Cornish, supra note 54, at 1192 (noting that domestic partnership laws generally have
requirements nearly identical to marriage for domestic partners, in addition to a
cohabitation requirement); William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United
States: A Review and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REv. 961, 969-74 (2001) (same, but in
greater detail). See also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(b) (West 2004) (requiring
individuals seeking a domestic partnership to be (1) cohabiting, (2) unmarried, (3)
unrelated by blood to the same extent that the marriage statutes require, (4) at least
eighteen years of age, (5) capable of consent, and (6) of the same sex or of different sexes
and at least one of the individuals is over sixty-two years of age who meets eligibility
criteria under certain provisions of the Social Security Act).
Meanwhile, the second definition is too narrow because it only takes local domestic
partnership laws into account. Further, the second definition overgeneralizes: even local
domestic partnership laws do not necessarily extend employee-partnership benefits to
domestic partners-some merely create registries. See infra note 171 and accompanying
text. Finally, for the states that have domestic partnership laws, their domestic
partnerships are decidedly not recognized as "equivalent to marriage," given that they
neither confer full marital benefits nor are given the title of "marriage."
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are two types of domestic partnership laws-state and local. Currently four
states and the District of Columbia have domestic partnership laws that
provide some of the more important marital benefits to same-sex couples. 153
In addition, over seventy cities and counties have domestic partnership
registries, some of which provide benefits for registered domestic partners. 1
54
State and local domestic partnership laws are very different in scope and
meaning, and thus they must be analyzed separately under an equal
protection framework. Therefore, subsections a and b, below, will analyze
whether Category III amendments violate the Romer framework based on
their impacts on state and local domestic partnership laws, respectively.
153 The states are California, see CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004); Hawaii, see
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1-C-7 (Supp. 2005); Maine, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 2710 (Supp. 2006); and Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.60.010-26.60.070
(2007). Washington, D.C.'s domestic partnership laws are found at D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 32-702 (LexisNexis 2007). Note, however, that Hawaii refers to domestic partners, as
"reciprocal beneficiaries." To illustrate the types of benefits under these laws, in Maine
domestic partners are entitled to, among other things, inheritance without a will, ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-102 (2004 & Supp. 2006); making funeral and burial
arrangements, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2843-A (2004 & Supp. 2006); entitlement
to be named guardian or conservator if partner becomes incapacitated, ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-309, 5-311 (Supp. 2004 & 2006); entitlement .to make organ and
tissue donation, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2902 (2004 & Supp. 2006); and explicit
protection in the state's domestic violence laws, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002
(Supp. 2006). See also supra note 42 (listing benefits for reciprocal beneficiaries in
Hawaii).
154 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, STATE AND
LOCAL DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP REGISTRIES (2004), available at
http://www.sfgov.org/site/sfhumanrightspage.asp?id=6283 (listing seventy-three local
governments, including Washington, D.C., having domestic partnership registries as of
December 2004). The localities that had domestic partnership registries in 2004 were
Arcata, Berkeley, Cathedral City, Davis, Laguna Beach, Long Beach, Los Angeles
County, Main County, Oakland, Palm Springs, Palo Alto, Petaluma, Sacramento, San
Francisco, City of Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara County, Santa Monica, and West
Hollywood, California; Boulder and Denver, Colorado; Hartford, Connecticut; The
District of Columbia (Washington, D.C.); Broward County, Key West, and Miami Beach,
Florida; Atlanta and Fulton County, Georgia; Cook County and Oak Park, Illinois; Iowa
City, Iowa; New Orleans, Louisiana; Portland, Maine; Takoma Park, Maryland; Boston,
Brewster, Brookline, Cambridge, Nantucket, Provincetown, and Truro, Massachusetts;
Ann Arbor, Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Jackson County, Kansas City, and St.
Louis, Missouri; Albany, East Hampton, Village of Great Neck, Village of Great Neck
Plaza, Huntington, Ithaca, New York City, North Hempstead, Village of North Hills,
Rochester, Village of Roslyn Estates, Southampton, Southold, and Westchester County,
New York; Carrboro and Chapel Hill, North Carolina; Cleveland Heights, Ohio; Ashland,
Eugene, and Multnomah County, Oregon; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Travis County,
Texas; Lacey, Olympia, Seattle, and Tumwater, Washington; and Madison and
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
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a. State Domestic Partnership Laws
This subsection will argue that Category III amendments are
constitutional as applied to state domestic partnership laws because, despite
their infliction of substantial harm on same-sex couples, they do not
impermissibly restructure the political process. State domestic partnership
laws, as well as the domestic partnership law of the District of Columbia,
provide some marital benefits to qualified same-sex couples. 155 While not
recognized as a marriage, state domestic partnerships have sometimes been
called "marriage-like"'156 because they recognize a legal status for same-sex
couples and provide some important marital benefits to those couples. As
noted earlier, Category III amendments foreclose these partnerships because
they are substantially similar to a marriage. 157 However, while this
undoubtedly causes real harm to homosexuals, thereby satisfying the Romer
framework's first prong, it does not create an impermissible political
restructuring as the second prong requires. Each of these points will be
discussed in the paragraphs below.
Without question, the Category III ban on state domestic partnership
laws causes a real and substantial harm to same-sex couples. Part IV.C. 1,
above, suggests that banning domestic arrangements that confer all marital
benefits to same-sex couples is a severe harm; to ban all domestic
arrangements that confer only a limited number of these benefits is even
more harmful. Many marital benefits granted under state domestic
partnerships are important to committed couples; 158 however, Category III
amendments prohibit the state from granting these benefits and protections to
same-sex couples and their families through a domestic partnership.
Meanwhile, opposite-sex couples are free to attain a complete set of marital
benefits by entering into marriage. Thus, Category III amendments, just like
155 For a description of some of the benefits under domestic partnership and
reciprocal beneficiary laws, see supra notes 42, 153.
156 See, e.g., M.V. Lee Badgett, Op-Ed., The Wedding Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2007, at 14NJ17 (referring to California's domestic partnerships as "marriage-like
relationships"); Dahlia Lithwick, Please Say 'I Don't', WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 2006, at B2
(noting that Virginia did not have a "nothing-marriage-like" law-that is, a law
forbidding civil unions and domestic partnerships). This perception apparently is shared
outside of the United States as well. See, e.g., Polls Drive Gay Law Review, GOLD COAST
BULL. (Australia), Mar. 9, 2007, 2007 WLNR 4484008 (discussing the Government's
rejection of legal recognition of "gay marriage-like relationships").
157 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
158 See supra note 141 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of marital
benefits for same-sex couples and their families).
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Colorado's Amendment 2, "inflict[] on [homosexuals] immediate,
continuing, and real injuries"'159 in a broad and undifferentiated way.
That being said, Category III amendments as applied to state domestic
partnerships do not impermissibly restructure the political process. As
discussed earlier, the state has plenary authority to determine its own
domestic relations law. 160 This encompasses not only marriage or civil
unions, but any secondary domestic relations status that the state wishes to
endorse. 161 Simply put, absent state conferral of authority, local government
has no interest in whether the state recognizes domestic partnerships or not.
Since the state political processes remain intact and local authority is not
implicated, no impermissible political restructuring within the Romer
framework has occurred. Therefore, Category III amendments, as applied to
state domestic partnerships, do not implicate the second factor of the Romer
framework, and thus do not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
b. Local Domestic Partnership Laws
This subsection will argue that Category III amendments are
unconstitutional as applied to local domestic partnership laws because they
impose an onerous burden on homosexuals and impermissibly interfere with
local community preferences in a subject of proper local authority. The
paragraphs below will discuss the history of local domestic partnerships and
then show how Category III amendments, as applied to local domestic
partnership laws, violate both prongs of the Romer framework.
Unlike civil unions, domestic partnerships began as a local solution to
perceived problems with state domestic relations law. 162 During the mid- to
late-twentieth century, while marriage remained a binary and relatively static
institution, the structure of the American family had undergone a
revolutionary change. 163 While state marriage law only recognized marriage
159 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
160 See, e.g., supra note 125; infra note 162.
161 Indeed, domestic partnerships in California, Hawaii, and Maine were passed
pursuant to their authority to regulate domestic relations law. See CAL. CONST. art. IV,
§ 1; HAW. CONST. art. III, § 1; ME. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
162 Berkeley, California was the first city to enact a domestic partnership ordinance
in 1984. See Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States, supra note 152, at
965. By contrast, Hawaii was the first state to enact a domestic partnership ordinance in
1997. See HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 572C-4 (Supp. 2005) (noting in the annotation that
the provision-which sets out the requirement for reciprocal beneficiaries-became law
in 1997).
163 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) ("The demographic changes of
the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family."); Goodridge
v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963 (Mass. 2003) (noting "the changing
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as a domestic status entitled to any sort of financial protection, local
governments recognized that "protecting economically dependent individuals
and fostering happiness by recognizing relationships ... [were] equally
important to individuals in other [nonmarital] relationships."' 164 Accordingly,
many local governments created domestic partnerships as "gap-filler"
provisions to more equitably distribute "fringe benefits"--such as health
care-given to married government employees. 165 In 1984, Berkeley,
California was the first city to offer domestic partnership benefits; 166 by 1992
twelve local governments had enacted domestic partnership ordinances. 167 In
2004, at least seventy local governments had some type of domestic
partnership ordinance-far more than the four states that currently have
domestic partnership laws. 168 Thus, domestic partnership ordinances both
began as and remain a local government phenomenon, 169 created to deal with
perceived inequities and insufficiencies in state domestic relations law.
There are two types of local domestic partnership ordinances. The first
type simply provides a legal means to register a partnership but creates no
rights in the parties 170 ("registry" ordinances); the second type extends
certain municipal or city employee benefits to the domestic partner of the
realities of the American family" and how "Massachusetts has responded supportively
to" it); In re Rachel S., 766 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (Fam. Ct. 2003) (noting "the realities of
the changing nature of the American family").
164 Bowman & Cornish, supra note 54, at 1185-86.
165 Id. at 1194-95. See also Katz, supra note 143, at 669 (noting that domestic
partnership ordinances "are perhaps the first successful attempt by municipalities or cities
to regulate marriage-like relationships, a power normally reserved to the states").
166 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
167 Bowman & Cornish, supra note 54, at 1188-90. In 1992, the local governments
having such ordinances were Berkeley, West Hollywood, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and Laguna Beach, California; Washington, D.C.; Takoma Park, Maryland; Ann Arbor,
Michigan; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Ithaca, New York; Seattle, Washington; and
Madison, Wisconsin. Id.
168 See supra note 154 and accompanying text (noting that in 2004 at least seventy
local governments had domestic partnership ordinances); supra note 153 and
accompanying text (noting that four states and the District of Columbia have domestic
partnership laws).
169 See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 54, at 1198 ("[T]he majority of current
activity in the area of domestic partnership is taking place at the local level.").
170 See Katz, supra note 143, at 670 (describing registry ordinances as "provid[ing]
a legal method for registering a partnership"). See also Mark Strasser, Some Observations
About DOMA, Marriages, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 30 CAP. U. L. REV.
363, 379 (2002) ("Some [domestic partnership] ordinances offer symbolic but no material
benefits .). For an example of this type of ordinance, see BOULDER, COLO., REV.
CODE §§ 12-4-1-7 (2006) (providing for a domestic partnership registry but no attendant
benefits).
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employee 17 1 ("benefits" ordinances). Both types of ordinances are typically
passed pursuant to a "home rule" provision found in nearly all state
constitutions; those provisions grant local governments authority over
"police power" matters that directly concern their citizens. 17 2
Category III amendments generally invalidate local domestic partnership
ordinances.173 This proposition is supported not only by the language of
171 See Katz, supra note 143, at 670 (describing benefit ordinances as "extend[ing]
employee-related benefits to partners of city employees"). It is important here to note,
however, that the extent of the benefits given varies greatly between ordinances. See
Strasser, supra note 171, at 379 ("Domestic partnerships vary greatly with respect to the
benefits that they afford."). For examples of benefits given to domestic partners by local
domestic partnership laws, see supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. For
additional descriptions of the varying benefits accorded to domestic partners under city
ordinances, see Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States, supra note 152,
at 974-75.
172 For example, the Colorado Constitution gives cities and towns "all ... powers
necessary, requisite or proper for the government and administration of [their] local and
municipal matters.... ." COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. Colorado's provision is an example
of an imperium in imperio home rule provision, whereby local governments are given full
and exclusive police power with respect to local affairs. Thus, the local government can
trump state laws if its proposed ordinance falls within the exclusive domain of authority
delegated to it by the state constitution. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The
Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 10 (1990) (describing
imperium in imperio home rule); Bowman & Cornish, supra note 54, at 1199-1200
(same); Gillette, supra note 86, at 1364 (describing a type of home rule that "carve[s] out
areas in which localities have exclusive jurisdiction," although not referring to it as
imperium in imperio).
Another type of home rule is what Briffault called the "legislative model," which
conferred on localities police power with respect to local affairs, subject to restrictions
and exceptions by the state legislature. Legislative model localities thus do not possess
exclusive domains of authority, which is what contrasts them with imperium in imperio
localities. See Briffault, supra (describing legislative model home rule); Bowman &
Cornish, supra note 54, at 1199 (same); Gillette, supra note 86, at 1364 (describing a
type of home rule where a "grant [of authority] is expressly limited to those areas in
which local legislation does not conflict with state law," although not referring to it as
legislative model home rule).
173 There are two possible exceptions: Georgia and Wisconsin. Georgia's
amendment reads in relevant part: "No union between persons of the same sex shall be
recognized by this state as entitled to the benefits of marriage." GA. CONST. art. I, § IV
(emphasis added). By its terms, Georgia's amendment seems only to forbid state
domestic partnership laws but allows local ones. Indeed, Fulton County, which includes
Atlanta, allows certification of a "Committed Relationship" that extends county health,
dental, and vision insurance benefits to the partner of a county employee. See Filing
Instructions for Certified Committed Relationships, Office of the Clerk to the
Commission, http://www.co.fulton.ga.us/Fulton_County/CR Instructions.pdf (last visited
Oct. 9, 2007). However, the Georgia courts have not yet resolved the issue of whether
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Category III amendments, 174 but also by the official opinions of state
attorneys general. 175 Indeed, the only court in a Category III state to have
ruled on the issue-a Michigan court of appeals-concluded that Michigan's
amendment invalidated Ann Arbor's domestic partnership ordinance. 176
Georgia's "defense of marriage" amendment nullifies local domestic partnership
ordinances such as that of Fulton County.
Wisconsin's amendment states in relevant part: "A legal status identical or
substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not be valid or
recognized in this state." WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 13. While no Wisconsin court has thus
construed the provision, the state Attorney General has opined that the amendment does
not generally forbid local domestic partnership ordinances. Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. (2006),
2006 Wisc. AG LEXIS 24. While the Attorney General's opinion is not controlling
authority, it is certainly persuasive seeing that the Michigan appellate court and Attorney
General came to the same conclusion regarding the reach of Michigan's amendment.
174 See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 ("The uniting of two persons of the same sex
in a ... domestic partnership ... shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska."); KY.
CONST. § 233a ("A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or recognized."); IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28 ("A
marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic legal union that shall be valid
or recognized in this state."); TEx. CONST. art. I, §32 ("This state or a political
subdivision of this state may not create or recognize any legal status ... similar to
marriage.").
175 See, e.g., 2005 Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 7171 (2005), 2005 WL 639112
(Opinion of the Michigan Attorney General stating that Michigan's "defense of
marriage" amendment "prohibits state and local governmental entities from conferring
benefits on their employees on the basis of a 'domestic partnership' agreement"). While
Nebraska Attorney General Jon Bruning never had occasion to opine on the
constitutionality of local domestic partnership ordinances in light of Nebraska's
amendment, his official opinion issued on March 10, 2003 is broad enough to infer a
similar conclusion to that of Michigan's Attorney General. See Neb. Op. Att'y Gen. No.
03004 (2003), 2003 WL 21207498 (stating that a state law giving a person rights to
disposition of his domestic partner's remains and the making of anatomical gifts would
be invalid because it "would create new rights which spring from recognition of a
domestic partnership, ... [a]nd the rights being created are placed on the same plane as
rights which arise as a consequence of a marital relationship[; t]his would be giving legal
effect to a same sex relationship, thereby validating or recognizing it, which runs counter
to art. 1, §29."). But see Wis. Op. Att'y Gen., supra note 174 (Wisconsin Attorney
General coming to a contrary conclusion for Wisconsin's amendment).
176 Nat'l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Mich., 732 N.W.2d 139, 151 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2007). While Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc. v. Bruning challenged Nebraska's
Category III amendment on federal equal protection grounds, the district court noted that
plaintiffs were challenging its application to state domestic partnership laws, not local
ones. See Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 999 (D. Neb.
2005) ("Plaintiffs seek only 'a level playing field' that would permit them to access the
Nebraska Unicameral to lobby for legal protections that have already been permitted in
other states." (emphasis added)). Thus, since plaintiffs did not challenge Nebraska's
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While invalidation of local domestic partnership ordinances may not
seem significant, as many of them are merely registries, 177 it actually does
inflict real and continuing harm on homosexuals. Many domestic partnership
ordinances provide tangible, important benefits to same-sex couples,
178
benefits that would be forbidden under a Category III amendment. Category
III amendments, however, foreclose even the possibility of such benefits
being extended to same-sex couples in the future. Today, employee benefits
constitute nearly one-fifth of total employment compensation packages, with
roughly half of that being for health insurance. 179 To prohibit local
governments from providing these important benefits imposes a severe harm
on committed same-sex couples, especially those who have additional child
dependents. This substantial harm implicates the first prong of the Romer
framework.
Moreover, Category III amendments, as applied to local domestic
partnership laws, impermissibly restructure the political process by
interfering with local community preferences in a way almost identical to
that condemned in Romer. In Romer, Amendment 2 subverted local
community preferences on issues of direct concern to those communities, i.e.
anti-discrimination ordinances. 180 Similarly, Category III amendments forbid
localities from conferring benefits on their own employees and citizens or
providing a means for their own citizens to register their relationships.
Whether or not to confer benefits on local governmental employees and
citizens, and whether or not to recognize relationships solely for purposes of
the locality, are matters of purely local concern. They do not implicate state
interests, just as municipal anti-discrimination ordinances did not implicate
state interests in Romer. For the state to remove localities' power to pass
laws concerning the welfare of their own citizens constitutes precisely the
impermissible political restructuring struck down in Romer. Thus, because
they interfere with local community preferences on issues of direct concern
to the locality, as well as wreak hardship on same-sex couples and their
children, it seems that Category III amendments, as applied to local domestic
partnership laws, violate equal protection.181
Section 29 as applied to localities, the Michigan case remains the only one to address the
validity of local domestic partnership laws in the face of a Category III amendment.
177 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
178 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
17 9 See Human Rights Campaign, The State of the Workplace for Gay, Lesbian,
Bisexual and Transgender Americans 2005-06, at 3, http://www.hrc.org/documents/
SOTW20052006.pdf.
180 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
181 One might (erroneously) argue here that since domestic partnership ordinances
are passed pursuant to home rule provisions in state constitutions, the state can remove
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D. Category IV Amendments
In addition to prohibiting same-sex relationship recognition, Category IV
amendments forbid conferring individual marital benefits on same-sex
couples without state or local legal recognition of same-sex relationships.
Thus, whereas Category III amendments allow extending individual marital
benefits to same-sex couples so long as doing so does not confer a legal
status on those couples, a Category IV state cannot extend individual benefits
to same-sex couples at all. Because the harm to same-sex couples is more
profound than that experienced under Category III amendments, and because
they impermissibly restructure the political process, Category IV
amendments seem to violate both prongs of the Romer framework. The
paragraphs below will discuss each of these claims.
the authority to create those ordinances at will through amending the state constitution.
As noted earlier, home rule is purely at the discretion of the state. See supra note 173;
Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States, supra note 152, at 981 ("Since
localities are legally creatures of the state, a locality needs state authority to pass an
ordinance."); Katz, supra note 143, at 669 (noting that some domestic partnership
ordinances have been struck down by state supreme courts because they "ran contrary to
a general state policy"). Therefore, local ordinances can be invalidated if they contradict
state law or policy. See, e.g., Bowman & Cornish, supra note 54, at 1200-01; New York
State Club Ass'n v. City of N.Y., 505 N.E.2d 915, 917 (N.Y. 1987) ("[L]ocal government
... may not exercise its police power by adopting a local law inconsistent with
constitutional or general law."); Pub. Serv. Co. v. Town of Hampton, 411 A.2d 164, 166
(N.H. 1980) ("Local regulation is repugnant to State law when it expressly contradicts a
statute or is contrary to the legislative intent that underlies a statutory scheme."); Auto-
Rite Supply Co. v. Mayor of Woodbridge, 135 A.2d 515, 519 (N.J. 1957) ("The ...
ordinance conflicts with state policy and it is therefore void and of no effect."). Similarly,
the state has plenary power to grant as much or as little home rule power to localities as it
so chooses. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. Since the state has passed a
Category III amendment, the argument goes, local domestic partnership ordinances
contradict state policy, and therefore must be invalidated.
However, this line of argumentation was already rejected in Romer. The Colorado
Constitution grants localities an imperium in imperio home rule power. See COLO.
CONST. art. XX, § 6; supra note 173 (describing imperium in imperio home rule power).
Colorado then amended its constitution by adding Amendment 2, which removed
localities' home rule power to pass anti-discrimination legislation on the basis of sexual
orientation. Local anti-discrimination ordinances therefore conflicted with the state
constitution. Despite the fact that Colorado could have simply chosen not to grant any
home rule to its localities in the first place, and despite the fact that the Colorado
Constitution permitted home rule to be taken away through amendment, the Romer Court
nonetheless invalidated Amendment 2 on equal protection grounds. As intimated in Part
IlI.B, Amendment 2 was invalid in part because Colorado had chosen to give its localities
control over matters directly impacting their citizenry, and therefore Colorado could not
interfere with those local community preferences when they were of no concern to the
state unless it completely revoked home rule.
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First, Category [V amendments impose a severe and lasting harm on
same-sex couples. Volumes of reporters are replete with cases of unmarried
couples-including same-sex couples-seeking to partake in particular
benefits associated with marriage even though their union is not legally
recognized by the state. 182 Some states and localities have extended these
individual benefits by law even while not recognizing a legal status for same-
sex couples. 183 However, Category IV amendments deny gays and lesbians
any chance of receiving these important benefits. In short, Category IV
amendments impose a far more severe hardship on same-sex couples than
even Category III amendments; thus, Category IV amendments implicate the
first prong of the Romer framework.
Further, Category IV amendments effect an impermissible political
restructuring far beyond that of all other amendments. First, Category IV
amendments implicate at least the same localist concerns as Category III
amendments. Given that Category III amendments are unconstitutional as
applied to local domestic partnership laws,184 surely Category IV
amendments-which forbid local conferral of benefits-are unconstitutional
for the same reason. 185 Put another way, if Category III amendments are
182 Rovira v. AT&T, 760 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (death benefits); Doe v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 744 F. Supp. 40 (D.R.I. 1990) (life insurance benefits); Elden v.
Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1988) (suing for loss of consortium in partner's death);
Planck v. Hartung, 159 Cal. Rptr. 673 (Ct. App. 1979) (creditors seeking to hold both
partners liable for one partner's death); In re Estate of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App.
Div. 1993) (elective share); State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007) (application
of domestic violence statute to unmarried couples). See also JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 66 (7th ed. 2005) (describing Professor Waggoner's
proposed amendment to the Uniform Probate Code that would give an intestate share of
an estate to the survivor of "committed partners").
183 For example, Salt Lake City, Utah and the County of Athens-Clarke, Georgia-
both in states with Category III amendments prohibiting legal recognition of same-sex
partnerships-have recently allowed domestic partners of city and county employees to
receive benefits. A total of 145 local jurisdictions confer benefits on city and county
employees across the nation, some of which are also located in states having Category III
amendments. See Human Rights Campaign, The State of the Workplace for Gay, Lesbian,
Bisexual and Trangender Americans 2006-07, at 21,
http://www.hrc.org/documents/State of the Workplace.pdf.
Some state governments have also conferred individual benefits on a state
employees' same-sex partner without formally recognizing the relationship. See Citizens
for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1000 (D. Neb. 2005) (noting that
Iowa provides health care to domestic partners of state employees; Iowa does not have a
state domestic partnership law).
184 See Part IV.C.2.b, supra.
185 Louisiana's amendment concededly may not implicate localist concerns in the
way that Oklahoma's amendment does. Louisiana's amendment reads in relevant part:
"No official or court of the state of Louisiana shall construe.., any state law to require
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unconstitutional as applied to localities because they interfere with local
community preferences, then Category IV amendments are unconstitutional
under the same application.
However, whereas Category III amendments only appear to be
unconstitutional as applied to localities, 186 Category IV amendments work an
additional political restructuring that invalidates even their applications to
state law. Thus, Category IV amendments, insofar as they have applications
beyond Category III amendment prohibitions on relationship recognition,
violate equal protection at both the state and local levels of government. In
Seattle School District and Hunter v. Erickson, the Supreme Court struck
down a restructuring of the political system when it disadvantaged a
particular group.187  Category IV amendments implicate this very
restructuring. Category IV amendments forbid extending incidental marital
benefits to same-sex couples. 188 This restructures the state political process
by forcing homosexuals and their supporters to amend the state constitution
before petitioning the legislature to extend any of those incidents. 189 Thus,
unlike Categories I, II, and III, Category IV amendments restructure the
political process for ordinary political activism, not simply for matters of
relationship recognition. 190 Category IV amendments uniquely restructure
that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any member of a union
other than the union of one man and one woman." LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (emphasis
added). Cf OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35 ("[No] provision of law shall be construed to
require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried
couples or groups." (emphasis added)).
186 See Part IV.C.2, supra.
187 See supra notes 81-82.
188 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
189 See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15 ("No official or court.., shall construe this
constitution or any state law to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be
conferred upon any member of a union other than the union of one man and one
woman.").
Ironically, it is possible that the Oklahoma amendment's incredible overbreadth
might save it from this impermissible political restructuring. Oklahoma's Constitution
forbids conferring incidents of marriage "upon unmarried couples or groups," not simply
same-sex couples. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35. However, this assumes that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court will authoritatively construe it in this fashion. The remainder of the
amendment is very clear in its purpose-to forbid same-sex relationships from receiving
legal recognition-and thus an Oklahoma court might still interpret the Oklahoma
amendment only to extend to same-sex couples. If this route is taken, then the Oklahoma
amendment falls under the same line of argumentation given in the text above.
190 Cf Parts 1V.A-C, supra. For example, under a Category III amendment, a
homosexual activist group could petition the legislature to allow same-sex partners to
collect an intestate share of a decedent's estate if a court finds that the partnership was
one of a certain mutual dependence (thus obviating the need for a legal "domestic
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the general political process for one particular group, an action explicitly
prohibited by Hunter and Seattle School District. Therefore, Category IV
amendments violate equal protection.
In short, Category IV amendments are not only unconstitutional as
applied to local government preferences, but also as applied to state law
denial of individual incidents. Category IV amendments, in addition to being
unconstitutional as applied to local domestic partnerships for the same
reasons as Category III amendments, impermissibly restructure the political
process for homosexuals in a way expressly prohibited by Hunter and Seattle
School District. Thus, Category IV amendments violate equal protection.
V. CONCLUSION
In his blistering dissents in the Supreme Court's two most prominent gay
rights cases, Justice Antonin Scalia noted that we are in the midst of a
"culture war." 191 While Justice Scalia's observation is clearly true, it is
equally true that public discourse has generally lacked an understanding of
how various states have responded to that culture war. State "defense of
marriage" amendments are typically characterized as being concerned only
with recognition of same-sex marriage; 192 yet, as the foregoing sections
demonstrated,' 93 many amendments go far beyond marriage, extending to
any legal relationship recognition and even to the ordinary political process.
Further, even those who do understand some of the subtlety underlying
"defense of marriage" amendments seldom appreciate the totality of it. Judge
Bataillon, while recognizing that Nebraska's amendment forbade state
domestic partnership legislation, 194 ignored its impact on local government.
The Eighth Circuit fell into the same trap and summarily reversed Judge
Bataillon without considering the question he overlooked: whether
Nebraska's amendment as applied to local government preferences satisfied
Romer's demand for equal protection. The question, of course, was crucial.
While the Eighth Circuit correctly determined that Nebraska's amendment
did not violate equal protection as applied to state domestic partnership
partnership" status, which would violate a Category III amendment). See DUKEMINIER ET
AL., supra note 183, at 66 (noting a proposed law that would enact a policy like the one
described). Such would not be permitted under a Category IV amendment because that
would be extending an "incident" of marriage to same-sex partners.
191 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
192 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
193 See Parts II and IV, supra.
194 See Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1002-03 (D.
Neb. 2005) (invalidating Section 29 based on its implications for relationships "similar
to" marriage at the state level).
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laws, 195 it ignored Section 29's unconstitutional application to local domestic
partnership ordinances. 196
To help elucidate some of the nuance, this Note has attempted to place
state "defense of marriage" amendments into comprehensible categories 197
based on the extent to which they restrict state and local recognition of same-
sex relationships. Moreover, this Note has attempted to develop a viable
framework, based on Romer, to evaluate in a principled way whether the
various categories of "defense of marriage" amendments comply with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 98 In applying that
framework, it appears that Category I and II amendments are
constitutional, 199 Category III amendments are constitutional as applied to
state domestic partnership laws but not as applied to local domestic
partnership laws,200 and Category IV amendments are unconstitutional to the
extent they go beyond Category III amendments' constitutionally permissible
scope. 201
Developing a viable framework for categorizing state "defense of
marriage" amendments and analyzing their constitutionality under that
framework is critical for principled judicial resolution of future equal
protection challenges to state "defense of marriage" amendments. But also,
this framework will hopefully provide valuable insight to states considering
their own "defense of marriage" amendments. While sixty-three percent of
Americans oppose same-sex marriage, 20 2 a clear majority-fifty-seven
percent-support some type of relationship recognition for same-sex
couples. 20 3 Thus, it is very possible that a state's population, while
uncomfortable with same-sex marriage, would be open to the idea of civil
unions or domestic partnerships. Legislators need to be aware of the options
195 See Part IV.C.2.a, supra; Citizens for Equal Prot., Inc. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859,
867-68 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding a rational basis in "steering procreation into marriage");
id. at 868 (focusing the equal protection issue on whether "the many state laws limiting
the persons who may marry are rationally related to a legitimate government interest").
196 See Part IV.C.2.b, supra.
197 For a description of the Categories and into which Categories the state
amendments fall, see Part II, supra.
198 See Part III, supra.
199 See Parts 1V.A and B, supra.
200 See Part IV.C, supra.
201 See Part IV.D, supra.
202 CBS News/N.Y. Times Poll, Oct. 27-31, 2006, at 21,
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/politics/20061031_poll.pdf (29% supported
civil unions but not same-sex marriage; 38% opposed recognition of any same-sex
relationships).
203 Id.
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available to them in drafting "defense of marriage" amendments in order to
accommodate their constituencies.204
It is difficult to predict how federal courts will resolve future
constitutional challenges to state "defense of marriage" amendments. Based
on a proper reading of Romer, I have suggested that Category III and IV
amendments have constitutional infirmities that must be addressed by federal
courts in future challenges. Yet the states approving those amendments did
so by large margins, 20 5 and federal courts generally have been unwilling to
flout such clear public opinion.206 But should federal courts be tempted to
ignore Romer's clear mandate in order to preserve a perceived legitimacy, to
avoid possibly losing their souls to incantations of "activist judges," they
would do well to heed the Tale of the Alchemist:
"You can give me the secret of gold?" [the Alchemist] asked the
charlatan.
"I will sell it to you!" the unknown visitor must have replied .....
"With the gold you will build a city .... It is the entire city's soul that I
want in exchange."
"It's a deal."
[The Alchemist built the City of Gold.] At the gates of the City of Gold
armed guards blocked the way to anyone who wished to enter, to prevent
access to the Cloven-hooved Collector, no matter in what guise he might
turn up. And even if a simple maiden.., were to approach, the guards made
her halt.
204 For example, if a state's population opposed same-sex marriage but was open to
the idea of civil unions or domestic partnerships, a legislator would not want to draft a
Category III amendment. Alternatively, if a state's population was opposed to civil
unions, or to all same-sex relationship recognition generally, a legislator would not want
to draft a Category I or II amendment.
205 In 2006, Colorado's amendment passed with about 56% of the vote, Idaho's with
63%, South Carolina's with 78%, South Dakota's with 52%, Tennessee's with 81%,
Virginia's with 57%, and Wisconsin's with 59%. See NPR, Election 2006 Results,
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/election2006/results/ (click on individual states and
follow "Ballot" links).
206 See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 50, at 9. See generally THOMAS R. MARSHALL,
PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1989).
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"Are you afraid our souls will fall into the Devil's hands?" those of the
City must have asked.
"No, for-you have no soul to give him." 207
207 ITALO CALVINO, THE CASTLE OF CROSSED DESTINIES 17-20 (William Weaver
trans., Harvest Books 1976) (1969).

